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VERY fittingly comes the approval of the Brandeis appointment from nine out of the eleven members of the faculty of Harvard Law School: only one opposed, the other having been too long out of the country to be willing to express an opinion. Among the nine three have lived in the community for over a quarter of a century and have participated in the professional life of Boston. One of them is Roscoe Pound, undoubtedly the most important figure to-day in the field of jurisprudence, a scholar of international reputation, a man of wide experience both as practitioner and judge, an expert in valuing professional and judicial fitness and capacity. Professor Pound speaks as one who has been thrown much in contact with Mr. Brandeis during the five years of his service with the Harvard Law School. But the real significance of the testimony of the Harvard professors is to be derived from the important part that Louis D. Brandeis has played in the life of the Law School during the last thirty years. Ever since his graduation, with the most brilliant record ever attained in the school's history, he has been cherished as one of its ablest and most eminent sons. At one time he was called to its faculty, and he counted as a valued adviser of its three great deans, Langdell, Ames and Thayer. He has had, moreover, an important official connection with the school. The board of Overseers of Harvard University appoints annually a committee to visit the Law School, whose duty it is to supervise the work, to report on the activities of faculty and students, and whose function is important in establishing and guiding the standards of the school. From 1889 until the present year Mr. Brandeis has annually been appointed a member of this visiting committee, with such distinguished associates as Charles C. Beaman, Judge Jeremiah Smith, the late James C. Carter, Attorney-General Bonaparte, Judge Grant, Justice Loring, Chief-Justice Mitchell, Justice Swayzie, Mr. Justice Hughes, and ex-Secretary Stimson. The Overseers themselves who year after year appointed Mr. Brandeis have included such irreproachable Bostonians as Senator Lodge, Governor Wolcott, Moorfield Storey, Judge Lowell, Judge Grant, Senator Hoar, Governor Long, Justice Loring, Lieutenant Governor Frothingham and Frederick Fish. If Mr. Brandeis is flagrantly unworthy to be a Justice of the Supreme Court he could not have been wholly worthy of the support of such an immaculate body for so responsible a work.

CRITICISM of the Root speech by the Democrats has concentrated upon two points. If Mr. Root and the Republicans believe that the American government should have protested against the violation of Belgium, why didn't they say so at the time? This retort has a great deal of force. Mr. Roosevelt was the only American political leader who did advocate a protest soon after the violation took place. Even he did not publish his plea until the war had been going on for three months. Mr. Roosevelt's lead was followed by politically prominent Republicans only after the campaign started and the party needed an issue. Individual Republicans may believe that a great op-

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portunity was lost when the protest was not made; but they will be embarrassed in making party capital out of the failure, and are scarcely entitled to do so. The other criticism is less true but even more effective. It is that the Roosevelt or the Root policy would have meant war with Germany and with Mexico. This is probably false, yet inasmuch as Mr. Wilson's critics are advocating a more vigorous assertion of American grievances, and as Mr. Wilson has actually kept the peace in accordance with the wishes of an overwhelming majority of his fellow countrymen, it can be made to look very plausible. But the argument is as dangerous as it is effective. Any policy in relation to Germany and Mexico involved and still involves the danger of war. Mr. Wilson has been on the verge of war with Germany a number of times, and he actually engaged in a war with Mexico. He may have avoided serious hostilities, but he did so by also avoiding the grave difficulties which bring the danger of war with them. He cannot risk the popularity of his administration on his success in avoiding war without compromising his policy in the future by making a political necessity out of inaction and drift.

IT is still too early to decide whether the attempt made by Mr. Root to sharpen an issue with the Democrats over the foreign policy of the Wilson administration may succeed, but it seems doomed to failure. The Republicans of the Ohio, Mississippi and Missouri valleys have greeted it with ominous silence or frank disapproval. The Democrats have welcomed it with joy. The repetition by Republican orators and platforms of the New York Idea would be peculiarly effective in uniting the Democrats and dividing the Republicans. In that event Mr. Bryan and his pacifist followers could not fail to rally to Mr. Wilson, while the large acreage of agrarian Republicanism west of the Alleghenies, which regards all foreign entanglements and responsibilities with suspicion, would tend to fall away from the party. The Republican politicians will never consent to such an assumption of risk in the beginning of a campaign whose prospects look so prosperous. They expect to win the election practically by default, that is, as a consequence of Mr. Wilson's unpopularity; and any attempt to sharpen the issue and to arouse a real discussion might win them credit, but would lose them votes. This analysis looks sound. There is only one candidate who would have a chance of success as the incarnation of the New York Idea—Theodore Roosevelt. It is his idea, and he might induce a lot of people to vote for it who did not really believe in it, just as he did with the Progressive platform in 1912. It needs the kind of propagation which he alone can give to it. The Root speech cannot survive except as the prophecy of a Roosevelt candidacy. When Mr. Root allowed Mr. Barnes to edit Mr. Roosevelt's name out of the text, he accepted a revision which took the political reality out of his strong phrases. Yet Mr. Roosevelt's candidacy based upon such an issue would, like Mr. Root's, be certain to split the party, which, it is needless to say, would provide almost a decisive argument for Mr. Roosevelt's opponents.

ON its face the Nicaragua treaty seems a good bargain for both parties. Our huge capital in the Panama Canal is worth safeguarding against the possible competition of an alternative route, and our national interests in the Caribbean are protected by the acquisition of control of naval bases on the Nicaraguan coast. Nicaragua obtains in return a sum equivalent to a year's total revenue, with which she may relieve her budget by extinguishing one-third of her national debt, or may increase her revenues through a much needed policy of internal improvements. Her sovereignty is impaired only to the extent that we retain the right to approve or reject projects for spending the $3,000,000 on internal development. In this respect the treaty that has just been ratified by the Senate is wholly different from the one originally proposed by the State Department, which established the exercise by the United States of the same kind of protection and control over Nicaragua as that provided by the pending treaty with Haiti. The alterations were dictated by the Senate in the interest of the "sovereignty" of Nicaragua, but they alter the words rather than the facts. The facts themselves are both grim and disquieting. It is notorious that the existing government of Nicaragua has been supported for some time by a body of American marines. If they were withdrawn the government would almost certainly succumb to a revolution. We are making, that is, a treaty with a government which depends on American support, and in that treaty we are carefully refraining from doing violence to Nicaragua "sovereignty." It is this hypocrisy that is both sinister and disgusting; sinister because it makes the United States partly responsible for the acts of a dubious government which it does not control, disquieting because we are neither doing all that we ought to do nor refraining from what we pretend not to do.

IF clergymen only felt free to take their texts from uninspired writers, how abundant their material would be! Mr. Shonts, for example, president of the New York Interborough and an uninspired writer, has lately achieved a perfect text. "As far as I am concerned," he says, "I have but one rule in life, and that is that every obligation I

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made and every commitment I made was on the basis of quality and price being equal before I recognized a friend." He did not say, brethren, that he had but one rule in life so far as all men were concerned. No. He said, "as far as I am concerned." He did not say this was *a* rule of his life. He said it was his only rule. He had no other. He needed no other. This thought might lead him through the world's dark room, content though blind, had he no other guide. But, brethren, he is not blind. Under the bright light of equality in quality and price he surveys the bidders, recognizes a friend, picks and chooses him, forsaking all others cleaves only unto him, feeds him with generous obligations and rich commitments. Here is a friendship so fixed, so immovable, that it won't even start until quality and price are equal. Greater love have other men than this, but no man hath a love more blameless.

BOMBS from aircraft, as experience has abundantly shown, are chiefly effective as a means of murdering civilians and destroying innocent property. After over eighteen months of war not a single instance of important military ends secured through aerial bombardments stands established, while the killing and maiming of inoffensive persons, mainly women and children, has been a uniform result. Practically the only defense either belligerent has to offer for such barbarities is the right of reprisal. One of the great needs of international law is the rigid restriction and definition of this right. Neutrals cannot admit that if the military authorities of one country sully their honor by ordering wanton murder, the military authorities of another country have a sufficient excuse for issuing a similar order without soiling their own honor. There must be a vast though inchoate body of opinion in Germany opposed to Zeppelin raids, as there is certainly a large body of opinion in France and England opposed to bomb-dropping from aeroplanes. Here would appear to be an opportunity for neutral opinion, properly organized, to make representations with a view to the elimination of this most futile of the atrocities of war.

IF it was ever true in the past that capital made wars for labor to pay for, it is not likely to be true in future. The European war is making clear that in time of crisis the whole capital of the nation will be regarded as a public resource, to be drawn upon in whatever measure the national military policies may require. Slowly but irresistibly Great Britain is proceeding with her plans of conscripting private property for the support of the war. Foreign securities happen to be the category of property that can best be drawn upon at present; they occupy a position in the national interest analogous to that of the unmarried men. And just as progressive phases of pressure were employed to secure the voluntary enlistment of unmarried men, to prepare the way for conscription, so progressive phases of pressure are being applied to the holders of foreign securities to force them to place their property at the disposition of the government. First there was patriotic exhortation from unofficial spokesmen of the government; then an official but merely hortatory plan for the mobilization of securities. If the war continues for two years or more there can be little doubt that practically all British holders of American securities will be compelled to relinquish them to the government on such terms as the government chooses to fix. Other foreign securities, chiefly colonial, will follow, and the constitution of British wealth will become far more national, far more subject to fiscal control, than it has been in the past. This implies a serious weakening of the position of the British capitalist class. War will be very unpopular with capitalists hereafter.

AMERICANS of the more self-respecting classes, it is frequently urged, will not enlist as privates; therefore an adequate army based on the voluntary system is impossible. Higher pay will not mend matters; what repels the independent American is the tyranny of the officers. Now without doubt there are brutes and tyrants among our army officers, as among any other body of men clothed with power. There are also enlisted men whose conduct tends to bring out whatever brutality there is in the officer. The army is traditional-minded and is apt to retain many of the methods of keeping inferiors under that were once common in civil life but are now obsolete. Nor will this condition change so long as we rely upon romantic appeals to enlist men, and the penitentiary to keep them in the service. Give us a two-year term of active service and pay enough to attract men of the better types, and we shall proceed rapidly to eliminate the bully in shoulder-straps. Each year will return 100,000 young men to civil life, to praise their officers or to curse them, to facilitate enlistment or to make it more difficult. Under such conditions the corps of officers will be more keenly alive to the necessity of purging itself of the occasional petty tyrant who discredits it.

MR. JACOB WERTHEIM, president of the Tobacco Merchants' Association of the United States, is annoyed by "the widespread and fraudulent sale of so-called tobacco cures." He says some tobacco merchants have not realized "the extremely detrimental effect of these quack nostrums upon the smokers themselves, who otherwise have

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no scruples at all concerning their habit." So he rouses these torpid merchants by reminding them that "you cannot spread statements in the press, as these quacks selling fraudulent nostrums have done daily, without producing exactly the desired psychological effect upon many minds." Mr. Wertheim, if we catch his drift, objects to the advertisement and sale of fake tobacco cures because these cures, judged by their influence on smokers, are not fakes. It is moved and seconded that Mr. Wertheim be elected to membership in the I. C. I., or Innocent Captains of Industry. The qualification for membership is authorship of anything which makes people wonder how the author ever attained the rank of Captain.

GENERAL JUDENICH'S victory at Erzerum should soon affect the position of the Turkish armies in Persia and Mesopotamia. Small Russian forces have for some time been operating south of Lake Van, and there is now a possibility of clearing the mountainous country between Bitlis and Mosul. If this latter town is taken or even seriously threatened, it will be necessary for General von der Goltz to withdraw the Turkish Mesopotamian army entirely from the lower Tigris Valley. A retreat of this order will be extremely precarious, especially since the Arabs of the Desert are certain to harry the convoys of a defeated army. It would seem the part of military safety for von der Goltz to begin his withdrawal at once, defending Mosul with strong forces in the meantime; but so valuable is the Mesopotamian territory both to Germany and to the Ottoman Empire, that it is more likely that von der Goltz will remain there, try to hold the Diarbekr-Mosul-Bagdad line, and endeavor to bring up reinforcements from Sivas and Aleppo. The Turks have no railways in the Caucasus nearer than Angora, and it begins to look as if railways were to play the decisive part. The prospects for a Russo-British occupation of Armenia and Mesopotamia are becoming bright. Such a victory would neutralize the success of the Germans in the Balkans, and deprive them of their richest and most desired prize of war.

AT the outbreak of the war it was a favorite assertion of German spokesmen that the combination against Germany was engineered by England through motives of commercial jealousy. The whole non-German world, neutral as well as belligerent, repudiated the charge as absurd. In recent months Englishmen of prominence have been doing their best to give it color. They talk about past dangers of German "peaceful penetration" into Russia and Italy, and even into France and England, and promise drastic measures to make impossible a similar development in the future. Germany is to be commercially outlawed. The parties to the Entente are to bind themselves together by treaties of commerce discriminating against Germany, and join efforts to oust German trade from neutral territory. Of course if the Entente succeeds in crushing Germany by force of arms it will be entirely safe to carry out this program of economic strangulation, but in such event it would hardly be necessary to do so. If Germany comes out of the struggle wearied but unsubdued, a continuance of the economic war will be a disastrous policy. To confine German economic interests within the national boundaries would be the surest way to create in the German breast a desire to try conclusions once more with her enemies, who may not forever remain so numerous. At present the Entente holds the world market, but it can make this fact count in the negotiations for peace only if it is prepared to admit Germany to her old commercial privileges in return for suitable concessions.

Trade and the Flag

IN an article on page 94 Commissioner of Immigration Frederic C. Howe formulates three principles which he believes ought to be worked into any program of preparedness. The first is that the cost of armament should be paid for out of direct taxation graded to throw the chief burden on the well-to-do and very rich. Differences of detail aside, this has been the contention of THE NEW REPUBLIC since an increase of military forces became a practical political issue. Commissioner Howe's second postulate is that "there should be no profit from war." This is an impossible ideal, short of complete communism; but if Commissioner Howe means that the chief munitions should be made in government plants, that prices of other munitions should be regulated, and that special war profits should be reached by drastic taxation, then we can heartily agree.

The third point is by far the most interesting because there has been so little discussion of it. It is that the greatest source of diplomatic friction in the modern world centers about finance in backward countries. Commissioner Howe argues against the acceptance by the United States of the doctrine that the flag follows the investment of the citizen, that armed force should ever be used either to secure concessions, to protect them, or to collect debts. As we understand him, he wishes the government to wash its hands of responsibility for American investors and traders in backward countries.

To see what this means consider the case of Mexico. There are large American investments in that country. During the revolution they have de-

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preciated, much money has been lost, a number of Americans have been murdered. There has been a demand for intervention, resisted by President Wilson. Finally a government has been set up in Mexico under General Carranza. The United States has "kept its hands off"; the doctrine that the flag covers the investment has not been enforced. In other words, we have had a demonstration of the principle which Commissioner Howe advocates. A few days ago there was a circumstantial report in the New York *Times* that General Carranza will be refused loans in Wall Street. It was pointed out that the Mexican government is already in arrears of $64,000,000, and that no obligations of any kind have been met since the end of 1914. Mexican credit has been ruined "almost beyond repair." The article states that it is only a question of weeks or months before the Carranza government falls, and that the bankers are unwilling to lose money in Mexico. Finally it suggests that Carranza might secure loans if he permitted an American commission to take charge of the collection and disbursement of government revenues until the defaulted obligations are redeemed.

Commissioner Howe will have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of this. Through the control of credit the financiers are in a position to pass sentence of death on a foreign government and to put an effective veto on the clear intention of our own government. For without credit what can Caranza do? If he tries to raise funds by taxation he will evoke a revolution among his own people. If he tries to borrow outside of recognized banking circles he must deal with speculators and usurers, and yield concessions which would be ruinous to Mexico. Without funds he cannot police or administer his country. Yet the bankers can hardly be blamed if they insist on some security for the money they are asked to lend. Mexico must borrow. Our government can hardly say to the investor, "We will not protect you, but you must lend money." If we withdraw protection from the investor we have no case against him if he takes us at our word and refuses to invest. Yet his refusal to invest destroys the Carranza government and upsets the Wilson policy towards Mexico.

This is the sort of consideration Commissioner Howe has neglected to deal with. International *laissez-faire* is no solution of the real danger to which he points. What he wishes to avoid is war to protect investments. But the facts of a given case may require investment in order to preserve the peace. In our judgment he is right in believing that the relation between government and the financing of backward countries is the central problem of modern diplomacy. We differ only when he insists that the problem can be solved by divorcing government from finance.

In casting about for a better solution, a somewhat closer analysis is necessary. It is clear that British investments in the United States or French investments in England are not a diplomatic problem. The flag need not cover the investor. And the reason is that these investments are made in countries which have comparatively strong and modern governments. The problem arises only in the weak nations, like Mexico or China or Haiti. But even in these nations there are differences. Some groups of investors desire only security and equal opportunity. Others have more sinister ambitions. They intrigue to control the weak government in order to secure monopolies or to force their own government to establish a protectorate. In both cases the problem is how to establish a strong modern government in the backward country. Once that is done, the flag ceases to follow the investment.

Commissioner Howe's policy of hands off will not establish strong government in weak countries. As in the case of Mexico, it may actually keep the weak governments weak. And so long as they are weak, disorder will reign, nationals will be murdered, and peoples will be embroiled. We need a much more positive policy. We cannot turn our backs on the weak countries. We must act in order to make them strong. The central motive of a democratic foreign policy must be the modernization of the feeble and distracted nations. That is the only way to end the worst cause of diplomatic friction. That is the only program of peace which really deals with the trouble.

How to translate this intention into a concrete policy is not easy to learn. The plan of action will have to vary with the circumstances of each case. In some countries, China, for example, where weakness has produced bitter international rivalry, the only solution is probably joint action by the less aggressive Powers against the more aggressive. Some kind of international protectorate may have to be devised as a shield behind which China can gather its own strength. In certain Latin-American countries stability may be attained best by a Pan-American protectorate. In others, as in Cuba, a single Power may act to establish satisfactory government. Whatever the method, one thing is clear: if we are to avoid the dangers that Commissioner Howe has in mind, we must be prepared to take affirmative action on the causes from which these dangers arise. It is the old story of draining the swamp rather than of dodging the mosquitoes.

There is another point to be borne in mind. When companies are formed for investment and

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trade in backward countries, the policy of those companies is a matter of great public concern. What they do in Latin-America or in China is not a matter of business alone, it affects profoundly the foreign relations of the United States. At the worst these companies may wreck a weak government, or they may by aggressive and monopolistic enterprise bring on dangerous friction with a great Power. They may produce trouble in which American lives are lost. It is not enough to say to them, as Commissioner Howe suggests, we shall not back you up by force of arms. It is necessary to regulate them and keep them under public control. What is needed is a clear understanding about the kind of investment, the sort of trade policy, which the American people are ready to support.

No such understanding exists to-day, and we are in the perilous position of being open to unlimited liability for the action of Americans in the undeveloped nations. One administration may refuse to protect them at all, another may back them up at all times. The result is a foreign policy which has no consistency, in which it is impossible to count the costs and know what the responsibilities are. One of the very greatest services that any statesman could do for America to-day would be to work out a body of principles defining and regulating the relation between American diplomacy and American trade in the weak nations. Anyone who can contribute to that service will be dealing with the realities that underlie the problem of war and peace.

The Shipping Bill

OCEAN shipping in general, and particularly that of the United States, is admittedly in a bad way. We pay exorbitant freights, nevertheless enough ships are not at hand to move the goods we want to sell. In these perilous times we are forced to recognize the degree in which we are dependent for safety upon our navy, but we do not know where we could find sufficient auxiliary shipping to make the navy effective. No wonder our legislators feel called upon to enact a law comprehensive enough to cure at once all the symptoms and causes of our distress. Such is the character of the administration bill introduced in the House on January 31st to establish a United States Shipping Board for the purpose of encouraging, developing and creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine, "and for other purposes." The primary purpose of the bill is to provide a supply of ships on which we may call for auxiliary service in time of war. The "other purposes" concern chiefly the assumption of complete control over all shipping that touches at our ports, whether domestic or foreign. The object is a regulation of ocean rates not less absolute than that to which we subject our common carriers by land. Only an indirect relation exists between the two objects of the bill, and we may properly give each one separate consideration.

At the outbreak of the war, before American registry had undergone any artificial inflation, we had a tonnage of a little under 4,000,000 in the foreign and ocean coastwise trades. Over a million tons were in sailing vessels, and of the remaining three million only a relatively small fraction was adaptable to naval auxiliary service. For this service we should need at least half a million tons in case of war, and it is very improbable that we could find this amount on the instant. Accordingly there appears to be reason for public initiative in creating appropriate shipping. The Shipping bill, with its project of spending $50,000,000 if so large a sum is necessary, on the building, purchase or charter of suitable ships, is calculated to meet the need. At the normal price of shipping, 500,000 tons or more can be bought outright for $50,000,000. As the bill further provides that such shipping may be sold or leased to private persons of American nationality with reservation of rights of requisition in time of war, it might conceivably serve as an instrument for bringing and holding under the American flag a much greater volume of shipping than 500,000 tons. We may conjecture that such are the results contemplated by the sponsors of the bill. Ships owned by the government and operated under lease or charter by private citizens, or ships under a government lien but privately owned and operated, would involve a minimum demand upon the organizing capacity of the government. The bill wisely retains for the government the right to operate such ships through a corporation of its own organization in which it would hold at least a majority of stock. Without such a provision the government would find great difficulty in selling or leasing its ships without loss. It would be in the position of a middleman who is forced to sell and is confronted by a combination of buyers.

Whether the shipping thus brought under government control would represent a net addition to the world's tonnage or even to American tonnage depends entirely upon the use to which it may be put. If it is injected into the coastwise trade, as the bill permits, it will merely displace other American shipping, perhaps less suitable for naval auxiliary service. If it is injected into the established transoceanic routes, it will displace in normal times an equal amount of other shipping, American or foreign. If it is employed to establish new lines of communication, as, for example, between the United States and Latin-America or between the United

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States and the Orient, it will represent a net addition to both American and world shipping. The policy of establishing new lines would involve initial losses, but, as part of a systematic policy of trade development, might eventually yield rich gains. The invasion of established lines of traffic would entail relatively small losses, but would promise nothing in the way of an economic return. The bill is noncommittal with respect to these questions. It is safest to assume that the ship-purchase feature of the proposed law is to be judged on its merits as a naval auxiliary measure alone. As such it represents a public outlay, to an amount not determinable in advance, for a return in naval efficiency probably worth its cost.

It is to be borne in mind that the impetus to public action with regard to shipping has come not from the Navy Department, but from the Treasury Department. Government shipping was first proposed with a view to checking the rise of ocean rates. As a matter of fact the prevailing high rates are merely a symptom of a world shortage of bottoms, which shipbuilding enterprise is doing its best to supply. The government will not change this situation by buying ships and selling them again, even if it buys dear and sells cheap. It was probably a recognition of this fact that induced the sponsors of the Ship Purchase bill to incorporate in it the general principle of rate control over all shipping. The provision is sweeping. Common carriers, national or foreign, operating by water between the United States and foreign countries are required to obtain licenses from the board, which is empowered to " determine and prescribe just and reasonable rates or charges for the transportation of passengers and property in such trade." Carriers that fail to accept the orders of the shipping board will lose their licenses, and without license, no clearance. It is a brave attempt at national regulation of the international carrying trade. Great Britain, mistress of the seas, has recently considered a similar project and abandoned it as impracticable. Why?

We can prescribe the rates that foreign ships conveying goods to or from our ports must charge, but we cannot compel foreign ships to come to our ports. In normal times ocean rates need no regulation. On the seas competition persists, forcing rates to the lowest level compatible with continuous service. All attempts at monopolizing ocean shipping and maintaining rates have been unsuccessful. In abnormal times, like the present, ocean rates are high, not merely between the United States and foreign countries but on every trade route in the world. It is only the possibility of high earnings that brings a fairly adequate number of foreign ships to our ports to-day. Limit them to charges " just and reasonable " in the opinion of an American administrative board and we should get ships only after all the rest of the world had been served.

This is not to blink the fact that the prevailing high ocean rates are a burden upon our commerce. But so also are the prevailing high prices of steel and petroleum products. If the time has come for extending the principle of price control, why not try it out on the steel and the petroleum industries, which just now are making more money than they need? These industries are less competitive than ocean shipping, and what is of more importance, if we happen to over-regulate them they can't run away, as ocean shipping certainly would.

There is a kernel of good in the Shipping bill. As it stands, it would help to supply our need of naval auxiliaries. If it were made an integral part of a policy of foreign trade development, it might serve as well to advance the permanent economic interests of the nation. In so far as it undertakes to control shipping rates in the present or in any similar emergency it is founded in delusion. High ocean rates are an inevitable part of the price that the world must pay for war.

"Personally Offensive"

MR. JACOB GALLINGER is a Republican Senator from New Hampshire. Mr. George Rublee is a progressive lawyer from New Hampshire, with a very bad record from Senator Gallinger's point of view. He used to be a Republican, yet he voted for Roosevelt in 1912, and in the Senatorial election of 1914 he campaigned against Mr. Gallinger for Mr. R. B. Stevens, a Democrat who had been indorsed by the Progressives. With entire courtesy but with considerable force Mr. Rublee explained to the voters of New Hampshire that Senator Gallinger was archaic.

A year ago President Wilson made his first nominations for the Federal Trade Commission. The law stated that " not more than three commissioners shall be members of the same political party." The President chose three Democrats and two Progressives, Mr. W. H. Parry and Mr. George Rublee. A sub-committee of the Senate held private hearings. Senator Gallinger appeared before it and objected to Mr. Rublee on the ground that he was " personally offensive " to him. The Committee reported all the names favorably. In executive session of the Senate, secret, of course, all the nominations but that of Mr. Rublee were confirmed. There is no record of the vote, but it is known that Senator Gallinger renewed his objection on the floor of the Senate. Only a few days of the session remained, and a filibuster would have wrecked all kinds of

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legislation, so the matter was not pressed. After the sixty-third Congress had passed out, the President gave Mr. Rublee a recess appointment which is good until the end of the present session of this Congress. Mr. Rublee is now serving as a Trade Commissioner.

His name is again before the Senate for confirmation and no action has been taken. The other Senator from New Hamphire, Mr. Hollis, is a Democrat and an enthusiastic supporter of Mr. Rublee. So we have a curious deadlock in which a minority Senator can hold up the appointment of a Presidential appointee against the will of a Senator from the President's own party. How does he do it? By appealing to what is known as "Senatorial courtesy." Under this rule he need state no objections to Mr. Rublee's character or ability. He has only to say that Mr. Rublee is "personally offensive" to him, and even some Democratic Senators will refuse to confirm.

The ordinary sane man is bewildered at this hocus-pocus which permits one Senator to do so much damage—for it is damage. Mr. Rublee is an extraordinary man, and his is one of the best appointments made by President Wilson. He had a great part in writing the Trade Commission law. He understands it as few others do, and his presence on the Commission may almost be called essential to give it a successful start. He is not a politician nor an office-seeker. He is an ideal public servant, and if our government cannot use a talent like his the outlook is desperate. He can think and plan and invent; he has the genius of lucidity, and if politics is ever to be lifted out of the rut of routine and little-mindedness, it will be because the government is composed of men like George Rublee. The Trade Commission is to deal with the most difficult of all problems, the relation of government to business, and that intricate, delicate relationship cannot be worked out unless we can count upon men of fertility and power. If ever there was a man made for an office it is Mr. Rublee.

Senatorial courtesy is threatening to shut the door in his face. What is this Senatorial courtesy, and what is the best that can be said for it? It springs from the question of patronage on which the political machines live. Many appointments have to be made "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Patronage is power. Whoever controls it is political master. Sometimes the President quarrels with members of his party. To punish them he will appoint postmasters, collectors, and so on, who are hostile to the Senator. President Taft, for example, tried to punish the insurgents by appointing stand-pat Republicans in insurgent districts. The effect of this is to build up a rival machine and weaken the representative in his constituency. To protect themselves Senators devised the rule of courtesy, and regardless of party they will often refuse to confirm an appointment which is "personally offensive." A Senator from New York once kept a man off the Supreme Court bench because he had fought Tammany Hall.

This rule, which is a defense against the President, may easily become a conspiracy against the nation. In the case of Mr. Rublee that is just what has happened. He is nominated for a national office. His appointment has nothing to do with New Hampshire. There is therefore no shadow of an excuse for opposing him, even by the ordinary standards of patronage. It is a plain case of personal spite on the part of a peevish gentleman who doesn't like to be opposed. The reason Senator Gallinger can invoke the rule in this matter is that the other Senators are afraid he may refuse to abide by it in some other appointment which is "personally offensive" to them.

Senator Gallinger is stretching "Senatorial courtesy" to the breaking point. So far as we know there has never yet been a case in which one Senator has held up a national appointment because a man of a different party had hurt his feelings. Another motive complicates the situation. Many Republicans feel that the President should have given them the job. They have no excuse in law, and of course none whatever from the public's point of view. It is hardly necessary to point out that this preoccupation with patronage is a nuisance. Yet it exists, and for the present it cannot be abolished. But such particularly vicious abuse of it can be defeated by public opinion. All that is required is that the roll-call on Mr. Rublee be made public. The Senate will not dare to defeat him except in secret session. The crime contemplated by Senator Gallinger will be committed, if at all, in the dark.

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The "Equal Rights" of Nations

IT is at least a century since the law of nations last stood in such urgent need of rational analysis and revision. The whole international system is in the crucible of barbaric strife. Its reconstruction requires vastly more than merely restoring what the belligerents have destroyed. There is need for new concepts and the elaboration of new principles. There is work for constructive thinkers and for those who are bold in exposition. It would gratify Americans if their statesmen should assume the leadership in this great enterprise. The leadership, however, will probably be claimed by others; and an explanation will probably be found in Pan-Americanism. Because of its peculiar relation to Latin America the United States is bound to the ancient platitudes of international law in several matters of fundamental importance. European critics told us as much in 1907, when Secretary Root virtually made it a condition of our being represented at the second Hague Peace Conference that all American republics should be invited. We are impressively reminded again of the millstone about our neck by the "Declaration of the Rights of Nations," recently proclaimed by the American Institute of International Law.

Although framed by a private body—the Institute consists of a hundred and five members, five from the national society of international law in each of the twenty-one republics—this Declaration may be taken as expressing the attitude of Pan-America towards international law. Its framers represent the most eminent authorities of their respective countries; the United States delegation, for example, includes Secretary Lansing and two distinguished ex-Secretaries of State. Its principles undoubtedly have the support of our Latin neighbors and will be championed by the United States as chief defender of Pan-Americanism.

According to the preamble of the Declaration, national law in civilized states protects five fundamental rights in the individual—the right to life, the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the right to legal equality, the right to property, and the right to enjoyment of these rights. These rights of individuals can be translated, we are told, into terms of international law and applied to nations just as they have been applied to individuals. Thus translated they mean that nations have the right to exist, the right to independence, the right to legal equality, the right to territory, and the right to have these fundamental rights observed. The Declaration is thus based upon a major premise which is well nigh meaningless and a minor premise which is fallacious. Its conclusions are significant only because they illustrate the variety of internationalism which the United States as sponsor for Pan-Americanism may be called upon to defend.

The sweeping generalization of the major premise is dangerously misleading. To say that these fundamental rights are universally recognized and are "familiar to the peoples of all civilized countries" is merely to repeat euphonious dicta. Does it need to be suggested that equality before the law means one thing in the Dual Monarchy and quite another in the Dominion of Canada, that the right to property construed in a Bolivian court would pass unrecognized before the King's Bench at Westminster, or that the right to liberty of the Russian subject would cause a revolution in Switzerland? Furthermore, these rights of the individual even now are being subjected to searching criticism in most of the leading states. We are in an age which is giving new meaning to old maxims. We are coming to see that where individual rights conflict with the rights of society the latter must prevail. It is precisely this principle that nations need to understand in order that international law may become something more than meaningless generalities. Nations will not be helped to a realization of this need by an attempt to transplant a vague conception of private rights into the field of international law.

The minor premise of the Declaration is fallacious. When will publicists realize that national law, designed primarily for natural persons, cannot be taken over bodily and converted into a law of nations? When will they see that any analogy between persons subject to national law and states subject to international law must be drawn with the finest discrimination? To suggest only a few of the obstacles to such an analogy, it may be pointed out that while the natural person is movable, the state is immovable; while the natural person is mortal, the state is immortal; while the natural person is a physical thing representing only one of the elements of state existence, the state is an artificial thing requiring for its existence not only people, but territory, government, and sovereign political power. We may pardon Grotius and the early publicists for resorting to this analogy. They lived in a world almost devoid of international system. To meet humanity's need they drew from nebulous theories of a law of nature and from the systems of national law with which they were famil-

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iar. But surely it cannot be argued that present-day publicists and statesmen are similarly excusable, with the record of almost three centuries of the Grotian system open for their enlightment. We must conclude that those who persist in the twentieth century in reciting the ancient dogmatic analogies between the rights of human beings and the rights of nations are suffering from a dearth of ideas.

We are told in the first article that " every nation has the right to exist and to protect and conserve its existence." This is to be understood in the sense in which the right to life is understood in national law, according to which it is unlawful for a human being to take human life except in self-defense. The language of the United States Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion case is quoted approvingly: " To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us." It is respectfully submitted that this article could be cited in justifying the conduct of every prince and potentate now engaged in war's bloody business. It illustrates the futility of talking about rights when the nations are bleeding for want of remedies.

Article two proclaims each nation's right to independence and the pursuit of happiness free from interference or control by other states. What are the legal limits of a nation's right to the pursuit of happiness? Who shall say when the conduct of another state amounts to unlawful interference or control? This International Declaration of Independence affords in constructive suggestions nothing which we could not have read in a seventeenth century edition of " The Laws of War and Peace."

The content of article three does violence to reason. It informs us that " every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other state composing the society of nations." This right to equality, by admission of the framers, is derived from national law and yet it is something entirely different from any equality which national law attempts to guarantee. Most systems of national jurisprudence at least pretend to guarantee equality before the law, meaning that all persons who have the same rights are equally protected in their enjoyment, and that all who are under the same obligations are equally compelled to fulfill them. No system of national jurisprudence assures equality of rights and duties to all its subjects. There is inequality of rights and duties, for illustration, between infants and persons of legal age, between insane persons and persons of sound mind, between married women and unmarried women, and between citizens and aliens. Yet the equality of nations described in this Declaration is expressly declared to be not only an equality before the law, but also an equality of rights and duties. As between nations, quoting Lord Stowell, "relative magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor, and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation."

An equality of rights and duties is impossible in any workable system of international law. It has never existed in the international law of facts. To pledge the support of the United Americas to such a doctrine is to attempt to perpetuate anarchy. International organization, even by the slow process of evolution, can never be achieved while state equality is worshipped in this dogmatic form. Everyone knows that independent states do not have equal rights and duties. The differences between them in population, in territory, in wealth, in armed strength, in habits of thought, in conceptions of law and right, in all that goes to make up civilization, are among the most obvious and insistent of facts. By attempting to ignore these fundamental and essential truths we may condemn ourselves to impotence in the present crisis. Common sense should teach us that Powers like Great Britain, Germany, and the United States will not and cannot allow Hayti, Persia, and Salvador an equal right with themselves in formulating and enforcing international law. Perhaps it was inevitable that the American Institute should include the ancient platitudes about equality. Inevitable or not, the inclusion is none the less to be regretted. It illustrates most forcibly the handicap which Pan-American associations may place upon the United States when it seeks to play its proper part in the world's affairs.

A fourth article asserts that every nation has the right to territory and to exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and people. How unfortunate that the emphasis could not have been placed upon the growing interdependence of nations, rather than upon the exclusive and absolute character of national territorial jurisdiction. How significant that the framers elucidate the principle by quoting from an opinion handed down by a great American justice more than one hundred years ago.

There is some consolation in the last article. It asserts that international rights and duties are correlative, and that " every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations." Could this cardinal principle have been made the starting-point instead of being tardily recognized

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at the end, the whole tone of the Declaration might have been changed. Nations have a common interest in the efficacy of international law. May they not share in a common obligation to participate in some way in its enforcement? We are harping too much to-day upon the rights of nations. Our business is to devise remedies to the end that rights may be made valuable without desolating the earth in war. If the thought of the savants could have taken this direction, their proclamation might have been at least forward-looking instead of reactionary.

Pan-American thought on international questions is not particularly forward-looking. The republics to the south of us are extremely jealous of the rights of small nations. They are intensely suspicious of all interference from without. It is probably fortunate that they have this feeling, but the feeling undoubtedly blinds them to the larger currents of internationalism. Its embodiment in dogmatic form in such a document as the recent Declaration must raise in the minds of thoughtful Americans the serious question: can the United States afford to yield its place in the forefront of the movement for making international law a vital controlling force in world affairs, as the price of closer union with the Latin-American republics?

EDWIN D. DICKINSON.

A Sympathetic Strike

HE was a pockmarked Jew, crinkly-haired, with features set pugnaciously; but peacefully enough sipping his rye and soda over the foam-stained bar. It was late and business was slow; the very lights seemed depressed in their vain efforts to cheer up the dim corners of Nebbin's Palace. The Aphrodite Anadyomene lay dead upon the rear wall, and the nymphs and satyrs above the bottled goods were perishing from tedium. The host, bald, pink, enormous, undulated to and fro behind the bar as if there were an eager row of customers to serve. Presently he paused and leered at the Jew.

"Remember that coat you sold me? All the buttons busted off."

"What will you have?" retorted the Jew fiercely. "You saloonkeepers get fatter and fatter; no coat could hold you. Look at you, now—bearing down all over you. You're a fine one to fit."

The saloonkeeper chuckled uncomfortably. "Where are you now, Leo? I heard that you were leaving Erismann's."

"Me leaving? No, I went on strike. That's what you heard. Tell you about it. You remember Baruch? No—he never spent a cent in such a place as this. Awful nice fellow, Baruch is. He had a sick wife and four little children, and the boss paid him eighteen dollars a week. Paid me thirty-six, because I'm single and don't need the job. Every dollar the boss spends in wages has got to produce six. That's his principle. But every dollar he spent on Baruch produced twelve. Baruch had to be thankful for anything, with his sick wife and little children. He worked awful hard, jumping out on the street and dragging in customers and holding them till the boss could sell them.

"Well, Baruch's wife got worse and had to go to the madhouse, and Baruch couldn't keep from crying sometimes. And the boss didn't like it: 'How can I sell a customer with that fellow pulling his long face around?' In the busy time he stood for it, but so soon as the slack time came, Baruch came to me, and he said, 'The boss is going to lay me off three days in the week. I can't feed my little children on nine dollars, let alone the railway fare to see my wife, poor woman, so lonesome among all those nuts.'

"I got pretty hot. I went to the boss, and I said, 'What you want to lay Baruch off for, poor devil, with his four little children and his wife in the madhouse? You are certainly a good Jew! You ought to be out in the cemetery with a marble canopy over your head, where the other good Jews are.'

"'You Jew yourself, throwing it up to me,' he yelled. 'You shut up or I'll lay him off entirely! If you had any business in you, you'd see I've got to cut my costs in these slack times. Here I've got expenses of two hundred and fifty dollars a week. Where is the money coming from? You tell me, you smart Jew. How many customers did Baruch drag in to-day? Three. And what did I sell them? One twenty-cent tie and two pair of Boston garters.'

"'If you got to save money,' I said, 'why don't you lay me off? Lay me off two days and you'll save more money than on Baruch's three days. I can get along. Lay me off three days if you want to.' Then I began to get excited. 'Hell, lay me off four days, five days, six days! I don't want to work for a good Jew like you, that takes the bread out of a poor devil's mouth because he is in trouble.'

"'Yes, see if you can get another job these slack times!' yelled the boss. 'You'll come back here to-night, and I'll lay you off three days, and fire Baruch.'

"Well, I went over to the store opposite, and they said, 'Yes, we'll take you, same pay.' But I don't like the boss, and so I go down the street to another store and they say, 'Times are slack, but you got lots of customers you can take away from Erismann: we'll take you on.' I make up my mind to see what I can get in other stores, and

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some of them wanted me and some didn't. At night I come back to Erismann's and I say to the boss:

" 'Boss, I want you to tell me which of these six jobs I got offered to me is the best?'

" 'Six jobs!' he yelled. 'Yes, you got six jobs! Everybody wanted a pocky Jew like you, of course.'

" 'There's the list,' I said. 'Call them up if you want to.'

" The boss looked at my list. 'Say, Leo, what you want a new job for? Haven't you got a job enough here? Ain't I always been good to you? Don't I take things from you another boss wouldn't take?'

" 'How about Baruch?'

" 'Well, I've changed my mind about laying him off. Poor devil, with his four little children, and wife in the madhouse! He ain't worth much now, but I guess we can afford it.' "

The saloonkeeper yawned. Leo threw down a Canada dime and a misshapen nickel, and shambled out into the darkness.

" Lord," said the saloonkeeper. " Ain't it awful to have to listen to 'em? And his trade here ain't worth fifty cents a month." A. S. J.

Incomplete Preparedness

SOME years ago I was in Denmark when a campaign was in progress for the election of members to the Rigsdag or Parliament. The issue that divided the voters was preparedness. The proposal involved only the building of several battleships, but for a nation about the size of Massachusetts this was a substantial program. The interesting feature about the campaign was not the proposal itself, but the fact that the landed and commercial groups in Parliament, which were promoting the preparedness campaign, coupled the program with a promise that all of the costs should be borne by taxes upon incomes. There was to be no burden to the farmers and workers at all.

A program for preparedness should be presented in its entirety. It should be complete. We should know not only the military and naval program and how much it is to cost, but who is to pay the bills, and what precautions are to be taken to avoid the known dangers of war and preparations for war. The program is far from complete when it is offered merely as a proposal for the expenditure of $2,000,000,000 and the increase in the army and navy to more substantial proportions. This is but part of preparedness, of common defense.

Everyone is agreed that the new preparedness is in the nature of insurance or precaution against war, or a means of defense in case of war. In either event, preparedness is demanded for the defense of the things we hold in common. We are preparing to protect democracy, the traditions, honor and dignity of the nation.

And when our common safety is involved certain principles should be axiomatic. One of these principles is that the sacrifice involved should be equal. That much should be agreed to by everybody. And equality of sacrifice involves equality of financial sacrifice. The burdens should be equally distributed. Even in times of peace this should be the first postulate of justice and democracy. The program for protection, therefore, should include the kinds of taxes to be levied and the classes that will pay them, as well as the objects for which these taxes are to be expended.

There is no difference of opinion on the part of economists that indirect taxes on consumption, on the things people use, are mostly paid by the poor, by those least able to pay them. There is probably not a political economist in any nation who does not agree that indirect taxes are unjust in their incidence, that they are class taxes, and in their operation are exaggerated poll taxes. For indirect taxes only yield a substantial revenue when levied on such commodities as sugar, wool, cotton, cigars, tobacco, beer, chemicals, and the things all people use. They yield but little when collected from luxuries.

Taxes on incomes and inheritances, on the other hand, are direct. They are paid by the rich and well-to-do. If we examine the Federal taxes of the United States we find that for fifty years we have collected almost all of our revenues from indirect taxes. The total sum so collected has amounted to about $20,000,000,000, almost all from consumption. Only within the past few years has any tax been levied on wealth. Even to-day we secure less than $80,000,000 from the taxes on incomes and from corporations. Last year the revenue from these sources was but $60,000,000. Wealth, income and inheritances yielded but one-eleventh of our revenues; taxes on consumption yielded ten-elevenths.

When we compare this with the countries of Europe we find that a very much larger sum is collected from the well-to-do. Great Britain in peace times (1914) collected $236,245,000 from the income tax, and $136,795,000 from taxes on inheritances. All told, she collected $380,115,000 from

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wealth in one form or another. Had the same per capita ratio been applied to the United States we would have collected about $900,000,000 from wealth instead of one-fifteenth of that sum. In Germany the taxes for imperial, state and city purposes fall largely on the rich, the combined income tax on men of large means often rising as high as ten or twelve per cent. The war taxes in Great Britain are said to rise to thirty-three per cent on the incomes of the very rich.

The shifting of taxes for our common defense on to those least able to bear them is indefensible. It means that the many who have but little shall carry the burdens of defense, while the rich and very rich are burdened hardly at all. And even an approach to equality of sacrifice would provide for the collection of at least one half of our federal revenues from taxes on wealth, incomes and inheritances instead of a ninth or an eighth of that sum as has been proposed.

Preparedness for our common defense should recognize another axiom. There should be no profit from war or preparation for war. There should be no suspicion in any mind that the sacrifices of the many mean great profits to a few. Protection of our country is like the protection of our homes, of the honor of a friend. Yet war does mean colossal profit to the few. There are classes in England that are reaping unparalleled profits from the present war. These classes include the banks, the shipowners, the mine operators, the railroads, the munition makers, and traders in all kinds of war materials. The munition makers are reaping the greatest harvest. Bread, wheat, meat, fuel, all of the necessaries of life have advanced from forty to sixty per cent, and the cost of living to the poor is increased accordingly. There should be no profit from war. This is one of the subconscious reasons for the demand for government ownership of the munition plants and the government manufacture of all war equipment and all war supplies.

There are other lines of profit from war, such as the sale of securities and war bonds which are handled by the banks; there is the profit from transportation; from a thousand connections with the government.

Even greater profits accrue to certain classes by reason of preparedness, especially by reason of a big navy. A reading of the diplomatic history of Europe during the past thirty years discloses that it is occupied with questions arising over overseas financing, over concessions, spheres of influence, over the demands of promoters and financiers who have drawn their respective foreign offices into Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, Persia, Turkey, China, Mexico and elsewhere. The doctrine first enunciated by Lord Palmerston in England in the middle of the last century, in connection with the claims of an English investor against Greece, that the flag of the country followed the investments of the subject, has converted diplomacy into an agency of finance; and the armies and the navies of the great Powers in Europe have been used repeatedly for the protection of the financial interests of the investors of these countries.

Preparedness for defense should take precautions against the establishment of any such doctrine in the United States. President Wilson repudiated this doctrine in connection with the Chinese loan. He refused to sanction the participation of the United States in the concert of Powers in the six-Power loan to China, on the ground that it struck at the political integrity of that country. He refused to permit the United States to be placed in a position where it might be necessary to use force to insure the debts or collect the claims of any of our citizens.

There is no greater menace to present-day peace than the doctrine of Lord Palmerston. It has led to the subjection of weak and defenseless peoples. It has caused numerous wars; it destroyed the political independence of Morocco, Tunis and Egypt; it was involved in the strangling of Persia, in the penetration of Germany into Turkey, and the activities of all the Powers in China. No doctrine is so fraught with danger to the peace of the country as the doctrine that the flag follows the investor.

All of these questions are an integral part of any preparedness program. And those who insist that the country should not be used as an agency of privileged business, that the cost of defense should not be thrown on the poor, that war should not mean great profit for the few and sacrifice for the many, are merely insisting on a completed program of preparedness. They want to be assured that labor will not bear the burdens; that the munition makers are not urging a militaristic program for the purpose of having the colossal profits which they are now enjoying from European war orders made permanent, and that the navy and the diplomatic service will not be used as an aid to overseas finance. Every nation in Europe has used its defence preparedness for aggression. They have sent their soldiers and their sailors to distant lands, and used their foreign offices for the protection and promotion of the great financiers and trading interests of the home country. Experience has shown that there are dangers at home as well as abroad, and that unless precautions are taken, privileged interests will use the precautions for defense for the embroilment of the nation in private quarrels. And America is no more immune from this danger than is England or France.

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One need only read the history of the years which followed the Civil War, when every privilege and every corrupting influence that could gain a foothold took advantage of the necessities of the government to seize the public domain, to exploit our resources, to control the Treasury, and to subject democracy to the will of privilege, to be assured that serious dangers are linked with militarism, even in a democracy; and democracy has a right to insist that preparedness does not mean the creation of new privileges and an end of its traditions and aspirations.

FREDERIC C. HOWE.

American Policy and English Feeling

I HAVE just come from the House of Commons, where Sir Edward Grey has delivered a speech which cannot fail to have a far-reaching effect upon the relations of the United States and England. With the terms of that speech the American public will be familiar, but it may be useful to say something as to its reaction upon English opinion. Of the impressiveness of the speech nothing need be said. In spite of his plain, unadorned, even halting manner, Sir Edward is easily the weightiest speaker in English public life. The fact is due to the rare elevation and transparent honesty of a character that dwells in a certain disdainful aloofness from all the dust and heat of the political arena. His influence over the public mind has never been more strikingly illustrated than on this occasion. He had to meet a great public agitation promoted in the columns of the Harmsworth press and the *Morning Post* on the subject of the alleged failure of the government in regard to the blockade. The case was based on figures that had already been discredited, and Sir Edward had no difficulty in showing that the methods adopted, while respecting the interests and rights of neutrals, were thoroughly effective in their purpose of destroying the enemy commerce.

But much the most momentous aspect of the speech was that in which he addressed himself to the neutral world and especially to the United States, and asked whether there was to be no discrimination in that world between the inconvenience which England's legitimate exercise of sea power—an exercise well within the scope of American precedent—caused to neutral traders, and the policy of ruthless piracy and murder which Germany has carried out on the high seas. The question was specifically related to the Lansing note, and gave expression to the deep undercurrent of feeling which has existed in the public mind on the subject of the terms and the spirit of that note. It would be useless to deny that that document fell on the British public like a blow in the face. Had it come earlier in the war its effect would have been disastrous. But much has happened in the past year to make public opinion in this country more reflective and less inflammable.

If one ventured to express the state of mind of a nation in a phrase, one would, I think, say that England to-day has lost in illusions and gained in power. The extravagant hopes and fears of the early months of the war have given place to a temper in which neither hopes nor fears predominate, but of which a well-apprehended purpose is the main inspiration. The apprenticeship which the nation has served to war has been full of bitter teachings, but its lessons have been learned, and if the confidence that prevails is less exalted than it was it is also more instructed. The chastening experience of 1915 has left few of our opinions unchanged. It has clipped the wings of a good many vaulting dreams and corrected many false appreciations. We are more humble but much better informed.

The change is especially apparent in regard to the attitude of the United States. In the early stages of the war there was a considerable body of thought in England that took the view that the United States ought to declare on the side of the Allies, and that the failure to do so would be the betrayal of a moral duty. An intimate appreciation of your republic is not a common attribute of the Englishman. He does not visit America as the American visits Europe, and politically he is absorbed in the preoccupations of his own hemisphere in a measure that makes the doings of America merely the echo from another sphere. But in the back of his mind he regarded the American nation as a projection of the Anglo-Saxon ideal beyond the Western horizon. It was a reserve of sympathy and power which in ultimate need would be found ranged on the side of England. He saw the external inflences that made for a common purpose. He saw a nation whose speech was his speech, whose fathers were his fathers, whose traditions were his traditions, a nation that had carried his ideals of liberty to a larger stage and given them freer scope. What he did not allow for, because he did not understand it, was the enormous complexity of the American position—the extent to which past differences had left their mark on American sentiment, the separation of its aims from the aims of the Old World, the extent to which German thought and German commerce had permeated the community, the legacy of hostility to England with which the tragedy of Ireland had endowed

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America, and the preoccupation of the Western States with problems which turned their outlook towards Asia rather than Europe and brought them into potential conflict with British diplomacy.

All this is much better understood to-day. There is a greater disposition on the one hand to allow for the difficulties of the United States' position, and a more modest view of the claims of England upon the active sympathy of neutral Powers. Apart from the extravagances of the *National Review* and one or two organs of the extreme Jingo party, there is a very noticeable decline in the adverse comment on the policy of the United States. But while the public discussion of the subject has diminished and sobered, certain broad and general conclusions have taken possession of the public mind. I am afraid it cannot be said that those conclusions are favorable to the Presidential policy. It is felt—and speaking as one who has done something to explain the difficulties of the President's position to the British public, I must confess that I share the feeling—that the attempt to preserve a perfectly even keel has given a sense of weakness, of a sort of decisive indecisiveness to the policy of the United States. There has been too obvious a determination to keep the scales even, no matter what is in them. I hold the view which is widely held, that the President missed his supreme opportunity when he allowed the atrocities in Belgium to pass without initiating action in the neutral world. It would not have been impossible for that action to have been directed not specifically against Germany, but generally against any breach by any belligerent of the laws of war and of the Hague Convention, of which the President of the United States was a signatory. Even if the action had resulted in nothing more than a formal watching brief in the name of the neutral Powers and on behalf of humanity and public law and rights, the fact would have had a profound moral value for the world. It would have held aloft a standard of right in a world of wrong that no other hand than that of America could keep erect. The failure of Mr. Wilson to do this left justice without any authoritative advocate, and constituted a grave surrender of a moral leadership which, so far from compromising neutrality, would have given it a more assured basis.

As it is, United States action has been limited to a nice and scrupulously exact distribution of notes which by their calculated balance have lost their sense of reality and their effectiveness. Germany has quite obviously treated them with small respect, and the British public have come to look for them with a certain amused tolerance, qualified by something much deeper, as in the case of Mr. Lansing's singularly severe note. It is impossible not to remember that on one side these notes deal with the murder of American citizens, and on the other with the delay of American letters and merchandise. We do not think that these two offenses are of equal gravity. We do not like to think that America thinks them of equal gravity. We have taken no innocent life in all this war. We have exercised our sea power with a scrupulous regard for the interests of neutrals. We do not admit that we do wrong in following precedents that the United States has established in the past. It is true that we have caused inconvenience to neutrals, but only such inconvenience as is inevitable in the legitimate prosecution of war; and what inconvenience have we caused comparable with the famine in Lancashire which resulted from the blockade of the Southern ports? But Germany has broken every law of God and man and broken it insolently, defiantly, over the back of America. It has sunk your ships and murdered your citizens. And you have sent to the criminal the same formulas of protest that you have sent to us about your parcels and your letters. Is this really the interpretation of the mind of America? Is this really the measure of your values and your moral indignation? I do not believe it. I do not believe that the nation which fought the noblest war of liberation in history has ceased to discriminate between murder and the little more or less of the counting-house.

If this calculated policy had had a restraining influence on Germany there would be something to be said for it. But has it? I can see nothing in the record of the past year to show that Germany is moved a hair's-breadth by the American protests. Mr. Wilson's great declaration that he would hold Germany to " strict accountability " and that he assumed in the name of America the guardianship of humanity, seemed to open up a new and nobler role for your republic. But German actions have covered that declaration with derision, and few to-day assume that the coincidence of the collapse of the submarine "blockade " was the fruit of that stroke. It seemed so at the time, but we know now that the submarine " blockade " ended because the British navy had defeated it. And German indifference to the law of " strict accountability " has convinced us that our conclusion is just.

I am far from suggesting that I am capable of indicating a policy which would have been at once pacific and strong. I cannot conceive that Mr. Roosevelt, had he been in office, would have seen his course quite so clearly as he sees it in opposition. America was lacking in the two main essentials of a decisive national policy—the material power to give it backing, and the element of substantial cohesion. But with every allowance for this, I cannot escape the conclusion that the President's

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policy has been equivocal and morally weak. It has offered the world no standard of values and no splendid indignation. American citizens lie murdered at the bottom of the Atlantic, and Count von Bernstorff is still the accredited representative at Washington of the government that sent them to their death. That is not a pleasant thought for Americans. Nor is it a thought which is balanced by the new note which comes as I write, protesting against the alleged interference with the American mail-bag. I grow tired of that mail-bag.

For the personal character and political aims of Mr. Wilson I have the profoundest admiration. I understand the difficult course he has had to steer. I realise how wise and statesmanlike his action has been, compared with the amiable but mindless pacifism of Mr. Bryan. I am sure that he has far-reaching purposes in connection with the part, the disinterested part, which America will play in the settlement of the world when the great tragedy that overshadows our lives and drains our blood is over. There is no one whom I would more willingly see exercising his influence in that struggle of the peacemakers than the President of the United States. But I think he would have come to that task with more authority if there had been in him more of the passion of indignation and less of the determination to see that no matter whether blood was in one scale or cotton in the other, the balance was always true. For we do not admit that this is a case of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. We know it is not. America knows it is not.

I have never held, and there are few to-day who would hold, that we have any special claim on the consideration of the United States. I do not think we earned any such special consideration in the circumstances of the War of 1812 or during the Civil War. But the cause of liberty and humanity has very peculiar claims on the United States. And even we do not forget that in this war the Monroe Doctrine is shielded by the British navy. Take that navy away and give Germany the victory, and the Monroe Doctrine is as though it were written in water. Nor do we forget that much as we may differ in many things, the civilization that we are spending our blood and treasure to preserve in the world is the civilization that you wish to preserve. Let us get below the mail-bag issue to the underlying truth that possesses us in common—the truth that this world cannot live by the doctrine of might is right, and that in the struggle against that doctrine it is we who have our faces to the light and our enemy that would lead us back into darkness.

A. G. GARDINER.

London,
January 27th.

The Inside of a Convention

MODERN American politics has seldom offered a more complete example of the subversion of the ideals of Democratic government than has just been afforded by the New York State Republican Convention. The Convention, officially labelled as "unofficial," was of course nothing of the kind. In intent and in effect it tore into shreds the far-famed primary law, but the voting sheep who will go to the polls in April will be no more blindly subservient to the will of the machine leaders than were the majority of the 832 delegates who gathered to the "unofficial" convention in Carnegie Hall.

From the outset there was but one question at issue, and about 800 of the delegates had as much to do with the settling of that question as the Rajah of Swat. The question was decided by a handful of men who gathered in a stuffy little room in the headquarters of the Republican State Committee, and another handful who held a secret conclave in the Republican Club. The question was simply this: was William Barnes, Jr. to maintain his grip on the party machinery in the state, or was control to pass to Governor Charles S. Whitman? This major issue involved several others of more or less importance, such as Mr. Barnes' determination to crush any incipient sentiment in favor of Theodore Roosevelt, and Governor Whitman's feverish efforts to prevent a complete blight descending on his Presidential aspirations; but the one big thing at stake was the personal fortunes of Mr. Barnes.

In the tobacco-laden atmosphere of the state committee rooms about twenty political reporters lounged on the morning of the decisive day. They occupied a strategic position between the little room where the fate of the delegates to the national convention was being decided, and that other room where a committee on resolutions was trying to decide whether Governor Whitman should be slain forthright or just politically mutilated. The majority of the twenty reporters were veterans of many political conventions and they shared no illusions. About noon a younger and less sophisticated member rushed in with the news that the convention had been called to order without waiting for the result of the deliberations in the two little rooms. The older men smiled. One of them said to the youthful enthusiast: "The convention was called to order last night in the Lotos Club and is concluding its sessions right here. As soon as this gang has decided how best to carry out Brother Barnes' orders we will all go up to Carnegie Hall and let the free and independent voter in on the secret."

The reporter knew what he was talking about. The majority of the delegates who sat by the hundred in Carnegie Hall imagining they were taking

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part in the solemn deliberations of a great party in a great state were in fact mere rubber stamps, who in due time would and did endorse the decisions of the handful in the two little rooms without even a clear idea of what they were endorsing. Every newspaper office in New York knew a week before the convention opened just about what would be done. There was some difference of opinion as to the amount of strength Governor Whitman could muster and to what extent he was to be mangled by the Barnes machine, but there was never any doubt as to the purpose and meaning of the convention.

Mr. Barnes laid his plans with all the skill in practical politics for which he is noted. The first step, taken far in advance, was to have the representation to the convention based on senatorial districts instead of congressional districts. The greater the number of districts the smoother the operation of the machine. From each of the fifty-one senatorial districts one delegate was selected to sit on the committee on resolutions and one on the committee on national delegates. These two committees constituted the real convention and were in turn governed by sub-committees of seven. When the machine was thoroughly oiled Mr. Barnes moved into action. "I am in complete control of the situation," he announced with that indifference to the niceties of political hypocrisy which has always characterized him.

There was one slight hitch at the outset. Elihu Root, Mr. Barnes's stalking-horse to prevent any chance of an instructed delegation for either Hughes or Whitman, did an almost incredible thing. In his "keynote" speech he had had the horrific stupidity to introduce Roosevelt's name in a manner that could not be construed as other than complimentary. Fortunately this outrage was discovered in time, and the amenable Mr. Root carefully skipped the passage when he came to deliver his exordium. As far as the speech itself went, it certainly left the delegates and the audience in the galleries unmoved. It is true that one of the delegates, a German saloonkeeper from Brooklyn, objected strenuously if privately to the criticism of Germany's dealings with Belgium, but the majority remained listless before the wrongs of Belgium, the crimes of Germany and the Democrats, and refused to get excited even over the tariff. Every time-honored trick to arouse enthusiasm was tried and failed. Mr. Root emphasized the proper words, halted at the proper moments; the venerable delegate with the white beard rose, waved his arms and exercised his shrill falsetto promptly on his cue; the platform was quick to give leads to the pit; and all to no avail.

The answer to the apathy which was supplied by the press table was: "They don't want Root." The corollary, "Whom do they want?" was not so easy to answer, but there was no question as to the one name that would have smashed that apathy to fragments. From the time when the first carload of delegates lined up at the Biltmore bar there was one name on every lip, a name mentioned with hate, fear, admiration, wonder, but never with indifference—Theodore Roosevelt. Barnes and his lieutenants were determined that that name should never be mentioned except in whispers, and they had their way; but they could not prevent the shadow of Roosevelt from lying heavy on the convention.

The net result of the convention to participants and impartial observers was disappointment. The popular interpretation of the platform adopted was that the Republican party condemned President Wilson for not going to war with Germany; yet everybody knew that the men who framed the platform had as much idea of declaring war on Germany as they had of declaring war on Timbuctoo. The truth is that the men who engineered the convention were about as much interested in national problems, from any point of view of statesmanship, as they were in the transit of Venus, and knew about as much of one as of the other. They were petty politicians, playing a petty game in a petty way, and they have merely emphasized the unanswered question, what have the Republicans as a party to offer as an alternative to the policies of Wilson?

ROBERT WARD.

A COMMUNICATION

The War As We See It

SIR: Protests against your "pro-Germanism" have already had this good effect, that they have made you speak out. May I add another protest, in the hope that it may provoke you to still greater clearness? I think greater clearness on your part is desirable. I have no objection to a German being a German, or a pro-German a pro-German. I read a violently Germanophile Spanish paper regularly and with pleasure. I know that honest men are passionate and that passion is blind. In a "clearing-house of opinion" I expect various principles, prejudices, and sympathies to find expression, and I am grateful that my own notions should be courteously admitted there, unshorn and unvarnished. My protest is directed exclusively against your editorial ambiguity. From the beginning the undercurrent of your writing has not been in keeping with your overt opinions. It has been impossible not to feel that if public opinion did not embarrass you you would be far more pro-German than you are. Many an article has begun with an insinuating friendliness towards the Allies that has had a pro-German sting in its tail. If you are really in favor of an inconclusive peace which requires some speedy check to German successes, why do you celebrate the last triumph of German diplomacy and the entry of Bulgaria into the war—somewhat sugaring the pill in another column? And why do you entitle this partisan

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article "The Debt of Bulgaria to the Allies?" The result can only be that the non-reader should suppose that the article was anti-German, and the confused reader, perhaps, that it was somehow impartial.

Your recent explanations do not clear the air. You say you desire an inconclusive peace that shall teach Germany that aggression does not pay. A peace that did this would not be inconclusive; it would be "the destruction of Prussian militarism." Militarism does not consist in having an army, but in the systematic abuse of an army and a people for the settled purpose of aggression; so that, for instance, it can be put forth as a marvel of forbearance (and of preparation) that after three successful wars fought in rapid succession, forty-three years should have been allowed to elapse before delivering the next blow. To renounce this hereditary policy would be for official Germany to be "crushed"; for the official politics, philosophy, patriotism and glory of the last hundred years to be entirely renounced and transformed. As to the remoter past and the future of the German people left to its unforced genius and idyllic emotions, no one who has lived among them can have anything but good-will.

What terms of peace have you in mind that would suffice to teach Germany that aggression does not pay, while not inflicting any wound, such as the loss of properly German territory, which would rankle and call for revenge? Could these be less than an indemnity to Belgium, the loss of all the German colonies, the cession of Posen to a reconstituted Poland, and of Metz and the French-speaking districts in the Vosges to France, while the rest of Alsace became a sovereign state within the German Empire? To secure some such terms, if they could ever be secured—terms which would only just save the world from being dominated by terror—a fearful up-hill task, a campaign of months and perhaps years, confronts the Allies, for whose efforts and wrongs your heart does not seem to feel the least sympathy, although they are fighting for what you profess to desire, and for your benefit as well as for their own.

As to an inconclusive peace, which I take to mean the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* but with Turkey and the Balkans henceforth under German influence, that would not teach Germany that aggression does not pay, but only, as the Kaiser has said, that everything is not to be attained at one bound, and that something must be left for future generations to conquer.

GEORGE SANTAYANA.

Oxford, January 5th.

[Mr. George Santayana here enters another protest, taken on somewhat different grounds, against the editorial articles on the European war published in THE NEW REPUBLIC. He is offended at what he stigmatizes our "editorial ambiguity." Our overt opinions may have worn a plausible air of pro-Ally orthodoxy, but they cannot be squared with the undercurrent of our writing. He interprets this telltale undercurrent as either an involuntary or a furtive betrayal of a suppressed pro-Germanism. He asks us to speak out and define our position with greater clearness.

That Mr. Santayana has found THE NEW REPUBLIC ambiguous in its war editorials is a matter for our sincere regret. We are glad to do what we can to answer the criticism, although not confident of complete success. In so far as lack of ambiguity is the result of the blind partisanship characteristic of Mr. Santayana's Spanish journal or of the Boston *Transcript* we have no wish to avoid the reproach. In so far as ambiguity itself is the result of a frankly puzzled state of mind about certain issues raised by the war we have no wish to avoid the reproach. But like Mr. Santayana, we would prefer unabashed partisanship to an ambiguity that was not necessary, particularly to one resulting from a mean and furtive attempt to avoid candor and to face both ways. We dislike to have any reader of THE NEW REPUBLIC believe us guilty of ambiguity of this kind; and if we can accomplish anything by further explaining our position, we willingly undertake the task.

Perhaps some of the supposed ambiguity may be removed if our readers will grant its full weight to one consideration which has been decisive with us. THE NEW REPUBLIC is an American publication. Its business is not to be either pro-Ally or pro-German. In so far as American interests or ideals are involved by the war, it is entitled and has intended to be pro-American. These national interests may look sordid and insignificant to Europeans or to American residents of Europe. They are, of course, far less dramatic and fascinating and terrifying than the interests of the belligerents; they are not associated with so much immediate suffering and danger, or with the prophecy of such ominous future penalties. But ill-favored as they are, they are our own; and they are of sufficient importance to command the allegiance of Americans. As we see it, they involve our future independent existence as a nation. Both groups of belligerents in the unscrupulous pursuit of military advantage are doing their best to persuade or compel the United States to ignore its own interests and play their particular game. They are making demands the satisfaction of which would seriously threaten our national integrity. It is the sense that both the Allies and the Central Powers are trying to use the United States as an accomplice to their own military success which is inducing the American people reluctantly to increase their armaments.

We infer from one passage in Mr. Santayana's letter sharp disagreement with the idea of an independent pro-American position in relation to the war. The Allies, he declares, are fighting for what we profess to desire and for our benefit as well as their own. We do not know whether he means by these phrases that the United States is under manifest obligation to enter the war on the side of the Allies, but he must at least mean that if we keep out of the war our moral and mental attitude towards it should be essentially the same as that of a Frenchman or an Englishman; that the one interpretation of the war of overwhelming importance to the American nation is the righteousness of the Allies and the turpitude of the Germans; that if Americans have any interests or ideals which prevent them from feeling and thinking as Englishmen and Frenchmen feel and think, such interests should be sacrificed and suppressed.

THE NEW REPUBLIC neither believes that the United States should enter the war on the side of the Allies, nor that, failing to do so, American public opinion is under any

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obligation to imitate French and English public opinion. A nation is entitled to put its own life first. All European nations did so before the war, and they seem likely to continue to do so after the war. That German aggression raised an essentially international question in which the United States has an interest we fully recognize; but the war for the European Powers is ninety per cent national and ten per cent international. For the United States it would be ninety per cent international and ten per cent national. Some day nations may fight for a predominantly international cause, but they are hardly prepared to do so yet. It is unreasonable to expect a country with the composition, the traditions, and the collective psychology of the United States to intervene chiefly on disinterested political grounds in a European war. The American people have been living in a world in which such issues do not arise and such demands cannot be fairly made; a world in which nations are supposed to safeguard their own interests and fight their own battles; in which Americans are entitled to be let alone because they let other people alone. Intervention by such a people in the most terrible and costly war in history, prompted by a moral judgment adverse to one group of belligerents, would be revolutionary in its internal effect. The American national fabric would as a consequence be ripped to pieces; we should be returning to the moral and mental attitude not of one but of several antagonistic colonial dependencies. We should be murdering Uncle Sam in an impotent attempt to become Sir Galahad.

If it would be suicidal for the American nation to enter the war without sufficiently real popular motive, it would be almost equally disintegrating to think and feel like a belligerent without becoming one. Individual Americans whose associations are with France and England and who are able to make personal sacrifices on behalf of the Allied cause may well feel and express passionate approval of the Western Powers and, if they please, hatred of Germany. It would be a callous and sodden people who did not respond to so much undeserved suffering and so many heroic sacrifices with a generous measure of sympathy and assistance. But they should look to their own country, too. The United States is passing through a test which, although less drastic than that of Europe, will none the less profoundly modify its future life. At such a moment Americans whose attitude towards the war is indistinguishable from that of Germans, Frenchmen or Englishmen are guilty of a kind of spiritual treachery to the American nation. They are scattering distraction among a people whose life needs to be pulled together by a loyal and enlightened attention to their own business. American security has been compromised by the war. The national bond, painfully pieced together out of a closely connected group of interests, traditions and ideals, has been relaxed. The nation is groping, confused and dismayed, in a fog of problems and dangers from which in its inexperience it had considered itself to be emancipated, and which cannot be sufficiently penetrated by any of its ancient lights. In this crisis the primary political business of good Americans is to seek the reinvigoration of American nationality by systematically adapting its organization, its equipment, its methods, and its purposes to the more exacting part which the nation will have to play in a more dangerous world.

The pro-American position assumed by THE NEW REPUBLIC must not, however, be confused with the traditional policy of neutral indifference to European political contentions, and of the complacent rejection of European engagements. The great lesson of the war for the American people, one which THE NEW REPUBLIC pointed out in its first issue and has been reiterating ever since, is that American isolation has come to an end. This lesson is very far from being learned. Millions of foreigners have migrated to this country, partly, at least, to escape their liability to the kind of responsibilities the redemption of which is now devastating Europe. Millions of native Americans have considered the freedom from these responsibilities the greatest privilege of American citizenship. These millions are beginning to realize that the old necessity of associating independence with armed strength has pursued them to the New World. If they consent to armament they do so chiefly for the purpose of preserving a kind of independence which is born of isolation. They are not mentally and morally adjusted to the higher standard of international obligation which is fairly imposed on a nation at once so powerful and so favorably situated as the United States. They fail to understand that the larger armaments themselves impair isolation and force the United States to seek a positive and useful place in the European system. This lack of mental and moral adjustment to the opportunities and responsibilities involved in relinquishment of provincial isolation is the most important fact of contemporary national psychology. Any journal which seeks to be educative in its effect on public opinion is confronted with the difficult and delicate task of bringing home these opportunities and responsibilities to its readers without alienating them by making unreal and extravagant exactions.

The editorial policy of THE NEW REPUBLIC has been moulded by the foregoing conception of what may be called our immediate national quandary. American policy and opinion must be adjusted to European obligations without itself becoming European. The adjustment must be based on an independent interpretation of European political contentions rather than upon the mere repetition of European war-cries. To act on these war-cries or merely to repeat them would be to seek the cure of ignorance by miseducation. The European belligerents were obliged to bolt the war just as it was served in August, 1914, as a raw, uncooked and undistributed lump. Individuals might discriminate in their minds, but in so far as they fought or contributed to the fighting they were, willynilly, helping to sail a boat that carried in its hold the huge load of all the purposes and actions of the Allies. Many Americans have been eager to follow their example, but so far from being under any obligation to do so, they have by their uncritical attitude tended to blur the outlines of a new American foreign policy, and to prevent a much larger number of Americans from throwing off their provincialism and making the indispensable readjustment. Precisely because we are being asked to take sides in the war in order to promote international rather than exclusively national interests, we are, as it were, officially authorized to break up the undistributed lump of the Allied cause. We are bound to separate the exclusively national interests of the several European belligerents which have no necessary claim upon American sup-

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port from the international interests. In so far as we neglect to make such discriminations, we shall not only be using the war as an agency of individual and national miseducation, but when the hour strikes we shall be wholly unprepared to make American intervention in European politics anything but a source of more friction and exasperation.

THE NEW REPUBLIC in its comment on the war has been trying to redistribute the lump in order to find in the European system a place for the United States other than that of a full belligerent. In making the redistribution we have accepted many of the claims and standards of the Allies. German aggression has been declared to be a danger, not merely to the independence of France and the security of the British Empire, but to the peace of Europe and the existence of international order. Our own interests were engaged because a Europe in which Belgium could be so wantonly violated was a Europe in the counsels of which the American nation could not share, and against which it would have to arm for its own protection. We approved the idea of a protest against the violation of Belgium, not because we believed the country was prepared to back up the protest by any exercise of force, but because the recording of American disapproval might have aroused among the Americans of the interior the needed sense of international obligation, and might have resulted at the end of the war in the explicit participation by this country in a new guarantee of Belgian neutrality. As a necessary consequence of such an expression of disapproval, the United States would have been committed to a benevolent attitude towards the Allied cause, but its benevolence would not commit it to the assumption of an unlimited liability for the debts of the Allies. Some time a method will be devised which permits a nation to exercise military and economic pressure on a belligerent without becoming the unqualified partner of its enemies. But American statesmen of to-day have not the initiative or the ingenuity to devise such a method. They still think and act in terms of political absolutes. They still prescribe war, which is the great melting-pot of desirable discriminations, as an heroic remedial purge for diseases in the heart and head of the international body.

Inasmuch as no official protest was made against the invasion of Belgium, and as the path of legal neutrality was selected, THE NEW REPUBLIC has argued in favor of stretching that neutrality in the direction of benevolence towards the Allies. The policy of benevolent neutrality did not require or even permit the surrender of the rights of American citizens under international law, in so far as they were affected by the military and naval policy of the Allies. Their explicit surrender would have been equivalent to a measurable participation in the war, and would have gravely impaired American independence without assuring corresponding benefits. We needed to be somewhat neutral as well as somewhat benevolent in our neutrality. And there was and is a way of doing it. While still asserting the legal rights of American citizens under the law of nations as the clearest existing evidence of that international order for which the Allies claimed to be fighting, the American government could use its own discretion in pushing its protests home. That is what has been done up to date, and that is what, as THE NEW REPUBLIC has insisted since the beginning of the controversy, the American government should continue to do until the end.

THE NEW REPUBLIC has argued in favor of a benevolently neutral policy towards the Allies on the ground of national interests as well as of international. The relation of the United States to the British Empire differs from its relation with any other Power. Putting aside all considerations based on a common language and legal tradition, which might well be a matter of indifference to Americans of continental ancestry, the two most important facts of American political geography conspire to demand a special arrangement with the British Empire. On our northern frontier is situated a great and growing self-governing commonwealth under the British flag, with which a quarrel would be disastrous. The United States must reach a complete political understanding with Canada or be condemned to a perverted domestic development and comparative external impotence. No less important is the special relation which the United States must occupy to the Power which controls the sea. Our isolation has come to an end because the ocean has been made a safe and effective means of communication, rather than an obstacle to it; for that very reason an understanding with the ruler of the seas as to the rule of the sea is indispensable to American security. The location of sea power and the objects for which it is used are involved in every phase of American foreign policy. Eventually we must either compete with the British merchant marine and navy or devise ways and means of cooperation; and manifestly coöperation is the better part. The United States might conceivably enter the European system as the associate of the British Empire, but if it became the enemy of Great Britain it would have to remain outside. In that event its influence would be restricted to the two Americas, and its resources would be wasted in friction with Canada and in building and maintaining a navy sufficient to keep the New World artificially separated from the Old. The policy demanded by the ending of American isolation is an explicit and intimate political association with Great Britain, Canada, and Australasia.

But precisely because THE NEW REPUBLIC attaches so much importance to political association between the United States and Great Britain, it has argued against the adoption of a war and peace policy by Great Britain which would force the American advocates of such an association to overcome insuperable obstacles. There is a danger that as a result of the war Great Britain may assume liabilities which will make a partnership with her impracticable. Every American advocate of a closer understanding must expect to argue in favor of the assumption by the United States of many responsibilities from which we are now emancipated, in return for the great advantages accruing from a partnership; but there are some liabilities the assumption of which cannot be considered. If the Allies should attempt as the result of a decisive victory to secure themselves against a renewal of German aggression by destroying "Prussianism"—which can only mean the destruction of effective German national organization—any agitation in the United States for a political partnership with Great Britain would have to be abandoned. The United States will not connive at a treaty of peace which aims to destroy the national organization necessary to German inde-

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pendence. Neither will it purchase a costly interest in a permanent international feud. In putting such a price upon its friendship the United States would only be clinging to those principles which the Allies have claimed as their own. American support has been demanded, and in the case of an influential part of American public opinion has been granted, on the ground that the Allies were fighting for an international object. But if nations are to adjust their policy to principles of international right, Germany and Bulgaria can claim the benefit of those principles as well as Belgium, Serbia and France.

No doubt the sparing by the Allies of a vanquished Germany will force them to assume the risk of another attack after Germany has recuperated. Moreover, even if Great Britain consents to such a generous policy as a heavy yet necessary price for American political coöperation, she may pay the price without getting the assistance. But dangers of this kind cannot be avoided by any conceivable redistribution of the balance of power in the treaty of peace. Even if it were possible for the Westen Powers to render Germany and Austria helpless, they could do so only by arming and encouraging Russian aggressive ambitions that in the long run would be more dangerous. They may not get security and peace by trusting to the German and American people to read aright the lessons of the war, but they certainly will not get it in any other way. A strong and contented Germany is necessary to the balance as well as to the concert of Europe, and similarly necessary is an American nation prepared to take sides against a dangerously aggressive European Power. Whatever else the treaty of peace does, it should not place obstacles in the way of the continuation of the complete independence of Germany, or to the early realization by American public opinion of the great benefits which may result from the accession of the United States to the political counsels of Europe.

If a complete military victory over Germany cannot and should not be used to wreak permanent political injury on that country, why pay its price? Why should not the Allies make up their minds to be satisfied with any margin of victory which will give them a net advantage in bargaining for peace? The war has already cost all the nations of Europe infinitely more than can be returned to them by any practicable treaty of peace. If it is continued through 1917 they will have accumulated such a mountainous debt and so radically altered the balance of classes in their domestic lives that repudiation and social revolution would seem to be inevitable. On any such statement of facts the argument appears irresistible in favor of a partial definition by the Allies of the terms on which they will make peace. A public statement of moderate terms would make it difficult for the German government to call upon the German people to fight until the bitter end on the pretext that the Allies were threatening their future national security and independence.

Mr. Santayana asks us to describe what kind of a treaty of peace would teach the Germans that aggression did not pay. The answer depends upon the cost of the war at the time of the negotiations. If hostilities last until 1917 and the bill includes over half the younger manhood of Germany and a huge proportion of the wealth of the country, a treaty which restored the *status quo ante bellum,* even with German influence dominant in the Balkans as the result of alliances with Turkey and Bulgaria, would be a wretchedly insignificant return for the sufferings and sacrifices of the German people. After they had time to think it over they would be certain to lose confidence in a government which had landed them in such a morass of debt, frustration and anguish for so dubious an advantage. We are not arguing that the Allies should consider such terms now or later. They are surely entitled to impose, if they have the power, much severer terms. But whether or not they decide to do so should depend not upon an inflexible policy of reducing Germany to political insignificance at any price, but upon a calculation of the comparative costs and benefits of making a practicable peace or of continuing to fight. We doubt whether they ought to persist in fighting indefinitely in order to obtain the terms suggested by Mr. Santayana. In his opinion a peace which did not include an indemnity to Belgium, the loss of the German colonies, the cession of French-speaking Lorraine to France and of Posen to a reconstituted Poland, would merely encourage the Germans to try again. Terms such as these are much less severe than those often suggested, but they have one fatal drawback. They would weaken Germany in her uphill contest with Russia, and would tend to keep alive in the German people those real and reasonable apprehensions of peril from Russia upon which the ruling class in Germany rely for their hold upon the nation.

Any misgivings we may have entertained about the cause of the Allies have always turned upon the contribution that Russia has made to the Alliance. The war originated in a quarrel between the Central Powers and Russia over conflicting ambitions in the Balkans. So far as the merits of that quarrel are concerned, we have never felt any obligation to prefer the Russian to the German case. Apparently the best solution would be a Balkan confederation with its capital at Constantinople; but if that cannot be, if the whole district cannot be placed under international control, and if one is obliged to choose between Russian and German domination in the Balkans, we would prefer the German. At least the Germans bring with them science, good administration, social order, and economic development. Neither the Russian nor the German political system allows much scope for liberty in our sense of the word, but the Germans are the most honest, the most capable, and the most enlightened administrators in the world, while the Russian administration is notoriously corrupt, incapable and ignoble. To establish the oppressors of the Poles and the Finns as the dominant Power in the Balkans, to insist upon a treaty of peace which would leave Germany more than ever exposed to future Russian attack, and to do these things in the interest of liberty, the rights of small nations, and international security and peace, would leave the friends of France and Great Britain an ugly cause to plead at the bar of history.

THE NEW REPUBLIC has argued in favor of an inconclusive peace, largely because it apprehends the consequences on the Eastern frontier of a decisive victory for the Allies. If, as so many Englishmen are declaring, Germany must be returned to the humble and inoffensive political condition which it enjoyed previous to the rise of "Prussianism," the effective instrument of the will of the Allies to suppress

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German nationalism must be the Russian army, for Russia would be the only Power which could exert continuously a force formidable enough to keep the Germans subdued. In spite of what Englishmen like Hilaire Belloc and Rudyard Kipling say, we do not believe that even if the Allies had the power to make Russia the jailer of Germany, English and French public opinion would consent; but we also believe that Englishmen and Frenchmen would eventually regret acquiescence in a course which would tend to weaken Germany as compared to Russia. To improve political conditions on the frontier between the two countries, it is necessary to reconstitute Poland not as a military vassal of any other Power, but as an independent state whose army could be thrown into the balance against aggressive action by either Germany or Russia. To push the German frontier to the Vistula or the Russian frontier to beyond the line of Posen would be writing into the treaty of peace the plans for future war.

Thus we differ from the pro-Ally Americans chiefly because we do not see Prussianism as an essentially malevolent political monster that will continue to vomit poisonous gases until it is destroyed by some equally absolute knight-errant of liberty. The Germans have made a terrible mistake and brought incredible sufferings on themselves and on other people, but by making such a mistake they have not condemned themselves to the abandonment of all political ambitions for the future or to the final classification of their national organization as criminal. History is full of similar mistakes, which were repaired and dismissed. Before the war began, "Prussianism" in Germany had 4,000,000 resolute opponents among the German people. After the war is over the number of the Social Democrats is certain to increase, provided Germany is allowed to settle her problems without the same kind of interference from other nations which perverted the course of the French Revolution. The years succeeding the war will become years of internal readjustment. All over Europe the people will be counting the cost, and they will be inquiring what they can do to their own political and economic systems, and to their own individual and national ideals, to prevent the return of such a hideous catastrophe. The result can hardly fail to be a measure of revolution that will make the fear of "Prussianism" as an abstract embodiment of political malevolence as remote as the fear of Bourbonism or Napoleonism.

THE EDITORS.]

CORRESPONDENCE

Why Lump Women?

SIR: Felicia, in "Educated for What" in your issue of January 1st, posed the question: "Shall we educate women for domesticity?"

The query irritates, with its smug complacency. The sound of it brings the picture of an endless lockstep of tired family routineers. Let's substitute: "Shall we educate women for scientific homekeeping?" An improvement—but we still speak of women in a lump sum. No one would think of saying, "Shall we educate men to be storekeepers?" Are men units and women a group? As a group women expect to marry, and as a group they confuse marriage with housekeeping. As a group men expect to marry, but never as a group do they undertake their careers. Individualization is the first step in untangling the problem of woman's indifference in industry.

ELIZABETH M. WAGENET.

San Francisco, California.

Praise for American Education

SIR: Before Professor Morse Stephens left Oxford to take up his work at Cornell, he was advised that there were two topics which were not to be discussed with Americans, namely, education and religion. A few years' observation taught him, he says, that education was the national religion of America. What would his English mentor say now to the mass of criticism which every week comes hot from the press? A single generation has sufficed to impress us that the modern world is vainly demanding a type of worker different from all previous types. The idea that ours is a democracy where the privileges of free education are readily open to everybody, proves untrue the moment we realize that we give more than an elementary training to only seven per cent of those who attend primary schools. Facts even more staggering have appeared in our magazines for more than five years and are beginning to lose saliency.

Nevertheless the old articulated system ought not to be blamed because the times required it to make a college career the object of its preparation. Indeed, if any later system shall prove to have done for its age what the classical system did for its time, the former will be worthy of much congratulation. The classical system has at least furnished the soundest critics of its own shortcomings and of its lack of present day adjustment, and has not only tolerated but advocated radical reforms. If any system devised by man which will fit the young mind for industry will equally fit him to look away from his own immediate needs, those of the older classical system may well wonder and doubt.

That radical changes are necessary in the educational system cannot reasonably be doubted. The present system is deplorably inadequate for the mighty industrial call which our time is making. But if impulsive yet inefficient reforms attempt to make that call the be-all and the end-all here, then we shall be as certainly destroyed by the rising tide of materialism as we are now menaced by the cloudburst of socialism. It is not an unmixed evil that only seven per cent of the elementary school population are subjected to the errors higher up of so faulty a system. What now might not be happening if the remnant ninety-three per cent had the added incidental intelligence which the great secondary schools give their pupils?

Is it not plain, when we scrutinize the facts, that the school system is not wholly as full of faults as we assert? Is it the inadequacy of secondary schools to prepare children for life that deprives the ninety-three per cent of proper equipment? Do the parents of the poor for that reason take their boys and girls out for good at the end of the grammar school work? How many of those parents would never send a child to school at all, if they were not

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restrained by the compulsory education law? Is it not idle for theorists to continue their endless chatter about systems and fail to meet real conditions? The problem is only partly, at most subordinately, an educational one; chiefly it is economic. When the brute facts of our material needs have been more bravely faced by the favored few, educational systems will be the least of our worries.

PHILIP BECKER GOETZ.

North Evans, New York.

Supports His Psychology

SIR: Mr. Barnes objects to my psychology in the article on Cezanne as paradoxical. But one of his "representative" authors, Vernon Lee, quotes with approval in her book, "Beauty and Ugliness," the following from Professor Münsterberg: "The suppression and inhibition of the idea of practical future end thus creates a suppression of the real external movement, an effect which is produced in the organism by an innervation of antagonistic muscles . . . But further we have assumed that nothing beyond the idea of the optical impression was to be in our mind. . . . The result must be that the feelings of strain and impulse which go on in ourselves are not projected into our body, but into the visual impression. . . ." What I have stated in my own way for the immediate purpose is, *pace* Mr. Barnes, essentially orthodox.

LEO STEIN.

New York City.

G. B. S. a Scientific Playwright

SIR: Doubtless the critics will consign Professor Goddard, author of the Shaw article in your issue of February 5th, to the limbo they have hitherto reserved for the exclusive incarceration of G. B. S. since he has taken up the cudgel in behalf of that facile gentleman. "Fools and liars," even when quoted, has a certain sting—especially when it is deserved. Mr. Goddard has been too wholly admiring of that "mountebank" with the "inveterate desire to turn even the most serious matters into a jest," to escape their censure.

Following the adjuration of the author, Mr. Goddard has attempted to present a symbolical view of his works. He has reduced the complex human relationships of the characters presented to their mechanistic elements and then solved the problem by the rules of mathematics. These discomfited critics may cry out at this point that such is not a proper method for forming judgment of a play. They may fall back upon precedents and say, "A play is a representation of life; it must be judged by the standards by which life itself must be judged."

They will have spoken truly. The problems of life, however, are solved in this day by just that process involved in Mr. Goddard's analysis of Shaw. Scientific management employs this method. The manager of a big modern industry does not occupy himself with the personalities of his pawns. These personalities must be cut away, they must be reduced to abstractions, to figures and tables of statistics which he can juggle according to the rules of his mathematical formulae. It is only since this has become the method of managers that the problems have begun to be solved.

Since this is the way of life, it is only just that playwrights should begin to use this method in building their plays and that critics should use it in reading them. What the world needs is more Shaws to write and more Goddards to read.

M. P. DOWDELL.

Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

Private Censorship a Duty

SIR: The editorial in your issue of January 29th regarding the action of Ward & Gow in removing *The Masses* from their news-stands, takes a position which is to me simply incomprehensible. To my mind there can be few more healthy signs than the recognition of one's responsibility in offering for sale merchandise, no matter what, of objectionable or even of doubtful character, and from my own benighted point of view credit is due to Ward & Gow for declining to sell what they regard, rightly or wrongly—I have never seen a copy of *The Masses*—as pernicious literature. As I understand it, under present laws the distributor of obnoxious literature is held liable as well as the publisher and author; a newsdealer would find himself confronted with a peculiar dilemma if he were forced to sell everything offered him and then be held accountable for what he sold. The action is parallel to that of the mail-order house which discontinued selling patent medicines, very properly declining to share in a business which they regarded as of doubtful ethical character.

Your editorial says something about a monopoly; surely, by your own statement, they monopolize only one avenue, and one of a great many. If that is a "monopoly," how about the man who "monopolizes" the news-stand in a hotel or office building, or, for that matter, his own location or store?

By my lights your statement that censorship by a private corporation is intolerable and that if there must be any censorship it should be public and official is, frankly, rubbish. We want to get along with a minimum of official censorship, but the sooner the seller, corporation or individual recognizes his moral responsibility to "censor" everything he sells and profits by, the better off we will all be. Congratulations to Ward & Gow.

GILBERT M. TUCKER, JR.

Glenmont, New York.

Inflexibility in the School

SIR: The letter by Mollie Starks in the issue of February 12th, referring to Rebecca West's article, "The Schoolmistress," seems to me worth comment. That the thought of former schoolmistresses is a source of inspiration to many is unquestionable, but I believe the writer of the letter reads the wrong meaning into Miss West's article as a whole. Miss Starks is living in the past, in that, she is still trying to make the pupil a subordinate part of an inflexible institution the object of which is avowedly to give help and preparation for actual life. How is it possible to condemn a protest against lifelessness in such an institution? Can a school any of whose teachers have become vitiated or who never possessed any virility, justify its existence? If it requires a "balanced and generous mind" to accept unquestioningly the teaching and discipline of an institution from which life and its real issues are excluded, let us hope that the number of people with Miss West's type of unbalance will steadily increase, for only so will it be generally realized that the school is for children, not children for the school.

JOSEPHINE CARTER.

Bloomfield, New Jersey.

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VERSE

I Will Send the Comforter

April lit the apple-flower and waved it,
  Music nested on the spray,
Loudly called the lookout bird through rainbows,
  Earth was curving into May.

In that hour the light from hillside orchards
  Pierced me, and the heavens about
Opened, and before intenser burning,
  Fire by fire myself went out.

Flashing seas beyond the melted skymark
  Sang beneath another dome;
There my vision sailed to breathless knowledge,
  Sailed and found and drew back home.

Peace was in me from the starry motion,
  Then this breast bore One divine,
At Life's marriage feast the hidden Lover,
  Master of the water and wine.

Through this flesh his suns of power and beauty
  Warned the moaning worlds to song;
Bread and healing from my broken body
  Fed the sky-bewildered throng.

Oh, my spirit would have freed earth's music,
  Radiant, captive, yearning, mute;
Swift I plucked and held up apple branches,
  Signals of the ripened fruit.

But the morning fell as leaves around me,
  And the clay unpurified
Mocked me, scourged me, till the dove-like glory
  Vanished from my wounded side.

Broken apple branches reaching sunward,
  Distant sea and no sail spread,
These remain, and clouds above the hillside,
  And the multitude unfed.

Yet my heart had found on one far island
  Where the high dream dipped its prow,
Arrowy odors of immortal apples,
  Raining from a golden bough.

Flame that led me in that hour of marvel,
  Shall we ever win again
Past the sea-line to the fruit and bring it
  Glorious for the hearts of men?

Helmsman, lover, I am empty-handed,
  Silent, empty, year on year,
But through all the skies my longing rises,
  Longing, longing. Will you hear?

The Comforter Speaks:

My beloved, I have never left you.
  Through your breath I breathe the night,
Through your veins my pulses flow in darkness,
  But in deeper worlds is light.

Deep within you sweep the burning splendors
  Brighter than your gaze can bear;
There I watch among the dawns within you,
  Sky on sky is folded there.

There I see the outward heavens open
  As the inner heavens unfold;
There, in tidal light, eternal islands
  Orb the ever-living gold.

On those inward shores are fountains lifting
  Powers and suns of endless might;
Songs of birth and gleams of dancers dancing
  Wash the ripening worlds with light.

Inward branches bear those fires of marvel
  Slowly in the lonely clay.
Whoso suffers for my flame shall slowly
  Find me in the inner day.

Wanderers deepening to those bright horizons
  Hidden by the bosom's wall,
Slowly as through music long forgotten
  Reach me and remember all.

Lonely one in silences unyielding,
  I am there whom tears conceal;
After victories I am in the stillness,
  Underneath despairs I heal.

Whoso suffers for my vision to bring it starlike
  Earthward out of dream at last,
Bears the fruit and deepens homeward from the darkness,
  Holy sailor of the starry vast.

RIDGELY TORRENCE.

To a Scarlatti Passepied

Strange little tune so thin and rare,
Like scents of roses of long ago,
Quavering lightly upon the strings
Of a violin, and dying there
With a dancing flutter of delicate wings;
Thy courtly joy and thy gentle woe,
Thy gracious gladness and plaintive fears,
Are lost in the clamorous age we know,
And pale like a moon in a garish day;
A phantom of music, strangely fled
From the princely halls of the quiet dead,
Down the long lanes of the vanished years,
Echoing frailly, and far away.

ROBERT SILLIMAN HILLYER.

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The Son

(Southern Ohio Market Town)

I heard an old farm-wife,
Selling some barley,
Mingle her life with life
And the name "Charley."

Saying: "The crop's all in,
We're about through now;
Long nights will soon begin,
We're just us two now.

"Twelve bushel at sixty cents,
It's all I carried—
He sickened making fence;
He was to be married—

"It feels like frost was near—
His hair was curly.
The spring was late that year,
But the harvest early."

RIDGELY TORRENCE.

Portrait of a Dilettante

Bright-eyed and chirping like a curious bird,
From twig to twig, from thought to thought, he hops.
Music, the stage, the arts—he never stops
But off he flits, hunting the precious word.
All he has read, all he has ever heard
Are but a cue for agile epigrams;
A sipper and a connoisseur of shams
He echoes echoes, garrulous and unstirred.

His nonchalance is proof against all hurt;
Of passion's valorous and sudden spears.
Under this shield his dapper soul goes free
The world may howl; important and alert
He goes through life as through a library,
Looking for first editions of the years.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER.

Sonnet

Across the taut strings of my yearning soul
Pass fingers of all fleet and beautiful things;
Comings of dawn and moonlight glimmerings,
Midsummer hush, and Sabbath bells that toll
Over broad fields, a sound of thrushes' wings
Near sunset hour, a girl with lips apart,
Wonder and laughter—these have touched my heart,
And left their music lingering on its strings.

At twilight of some gray eventual year,
A few late friends will turn, with tremulous breath,
From the raw mound of earth that hides my face.
Yet I shall still find beauty even in death,
And some lone traveller of the night will hear
An echo of music in that quiet place.

WILLIAM A. NORRIS.

Progress

Quoth a god:
See them move,
Slowly, serenely, onward,
Through mountains and all,
Stretching and dragging
Their long steel bodies,
Their slimy bodies,
Rib by rib,
Across continents,
And leaving their spawn,
Cities,
Behind them.
Egregious worms!

ALFRED KREYMBORG.

The Lapidary

Said Lord War to Lady Life:
Your eyes would make beautiful stones—
Stones more beautiful than your eyes.
I like them.
Just bend your neck three inches nearer.
One little blow will cut it.
You won't feel the rest.
As for the future Lady Life,
She will wear them and profit thereby.

ALFRED KREYMBORG.

Idealists

Brother Tree:
Why do you reach and reach?
Do you dream some day to touch the sky?
Brother Stream:
Why do you run and run?
Do you dream some day to fill the sea?
Brother Bird:
Why do you sing and sing?
Do you dream—
Young Man:
Why do you talk and talk and talk?

ALFRED KREYMBORG.

Aurore et Crépuscule

Morn woke my soul and the sombre sky,
And dawn into day was flowing.
Rose cloud to amber had blushed reply—
Crowding hopes in my heart were high;
You were their Dawn, unknowing.

Mocking forms in the mist-wreaths fly,
And the drift of night is growing.
Rest of the brooding dark is nigh—
Crowding memories voice their cry;
You, like the day, are going.

JOHN PYNE.

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After the Play

WHY did the anonymous author of this tall thin pamphlet, privately printed, and called "You Can't Have It Both Ways," choose to write a play and not a novel?

It is easy to summarize his story so that nobody would guess it was the story of a play.

Jonas Brillion, the hero, about forty, is president of a corporation which owns and operates the street railways in a town so small that the capital stock of the corporation is only about $12,000,000. Brillion has an ambition. He wants to break into the United States Senate. He is a candidate for his party nomination at the primaries. He is full of hope.

His opponents get to work on his past. They bring about the appointment of a committee to investigate his management of the street railway company. Queer doings come to light. The queerest may be briefly described in this way: For many years the directors of the railway have been voting large bonuses to Brillion. Every bonus is labelled "for extraordinary services." These extraordinary services prove when examined under the microscope to be in every way indistinguishable from such ordinary services as every street railway president is expected to perform. The committee's next discovery is that many other officials have been receiving bonuses, and that each of them paid Brillion fifty per cent of the amount received. What did Brillion, who is a man of simple tastes, do with all this money? He saved it and bought stock in his own street railway.

He has, in fact, bought so much stock that he now owns a majority thereof. In other words, as a reward for ordinary services, performed by himself and his subordinates, and politely called extraordinary, he has received a controlling interest in the railway he has served so extraordinarily.

You can guess the effect of these revelations upon the voters, who turn Brillion down hard at the primaries.

Six years go by. Brillion is a changed man. His way of running the street railway has changed. Instead of high fares, poor service and a stingy transfer system, his fellow-citizens now have a two and a half cent fare, liberal transfers and uncrowded cars. Brillion is a benefactor of his city. No one so public-spirited as he.

How did he do the trick? By paying stockholders about one per cent per annum on their investment. Caring more about his political future than about money, he is contented, for his own part, with a return of a little over sixty thousand a year upon stock of which the par value is a little over six million. Everybody is happy except the minority stockholders, who make more and more noise, bring suit after suit to put Brillion out of business. At last, being a man eminently just, he makes them an offer. He buys their stock for what it was worth before he began to run the street railway so as to seduce the public.

And now, with nobody but himself a penny the worse for his behavior, with wages high and fares low, Brillion makes his second attempt to get into the United States Senate. His opponent at the primaries, although a good deal perplexed at first, hits at last upon a simple way of beating Brillion. Every good American ought to make his business pay. Brillion doesn't make his business pay. Will you trust a man to run your politics who has proved that he doesn't know how to run his own business?

This simple accusation is sown all over the state. The seed mostly doesn't fall on stony ground. The voters shake their heads at Brillion's incapacity or eccentricity. "Even justice," one of them says in a speech, "ought to be a paying proposition." Others declare that Brillion's railway management is the most colossal of all recorded attempts to bribe an American electorate. But his greatest offense is the blow he has dealt an American ideal. No business is good business which isn't on a paying basis.

Brillion is turned down at the primaries for the second time and the last. Thus the play's title, "You Can't Have It Both Ways," is ironic. Brillion doesn't get it either way. He remains beautifully uncomprehending. Just as he never understood why he shouldn't have his directors vote him the railway in the form of bonuses, so he doesn't understand why he shouldn't run his railway so that it pays only one per cent. When the play is over he is convinced of his own greatness, and of man's ingratitude. He looks forward to revenge. He hopes to find a way of abolishing transfers and of turning every passenger on his street cars into a strap-hanger.

"You Can't Have It Both Ways" has several negative merits. It is not one of those plays so full of uplift that the spectator feels quite let down. One gathers, indeed, that uplift is distasteful to the author, who makes a minor character say, on getting home from the theatre: "Of course it's a good play. Fairly reeks with redemption." This is the same minor character, by the way, who has views of her own about the plastic arts. Asked whether she likes pictures she answers: "Yes. . . . No. . . . I don't know which I like, but I know which are the good ones." This same young woman, Brillion's daughter, is rather taken with a man whom she meets at a church sociable, and who confides to her that his profession is the telling of unpopular truths. She thinks him a disciple of Bernard Shaw, and is disappointed by the discovery, which she makes in a later act, that her teller of unpopular truths is a baseball umpire. I have often wondered what umpires do out of season, and in this play I find out. "Don't you know me?" he says to Brillion. "I've been in every audience you've had this campaign. I'm the voice that shouts 'Go on' when you're afraid you're tiring us." The author leaves me not quite convinced, though, when the governor of the state, a worshipper of the judicial temperament in its purest form, appoints this umpire to a vacancy on the Supreme Court. In other ways, too, this governor is peculiar. When urged to pardon a man who has been convicted of rape, and whose victim has since admitted that she offered no resistance, the governor refuses pardon in these words: "A woman may be too proud to fight for her honor."

One or two technical bits are new, so far as I know. When the curtain goes up, for example, we see a room which a maid is dusting, and our hearts sink. We expect another maid to enter, and the two of them to tell us all about it. But no, the author has deceived us. The maid hears something, stops, throws open the window, and she and we listen while a barker on a city-seeing motor tells us a few facts about Jonas Brillion, owner of the room and its house.

Such things do not wholly explain, however, why the anonymous author elected to write "You Can't Have It Both Ways" as a play. The reason must be, in this as in many other cases, that for a play you need only about one-fifth as many words as you must assemble for even a shortish novel.

Q. K.

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Books and Things

PART of this letter has appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*. So far as I know it has not been published as a whole:

H. M. Submarine "E" 7.

Dear Mother:

We returned safely yesterday after 24 days up the Dardanelles in the Sea of Marmora. It is hopeless to try to give a detailed account in a letter, but you can take it from me it was a fine show. We broke all previous records. Cochrane was absolutely splendid. The tale of our doings is the sort of thing one reads of in the old days. We went around the Sea of Marmora, leaving a trail of sunk and burning ships. We fairly shook things to the core.

We are the first submarine in history to bombard a place on shore under fire. I think we were under fire about three times a day on an average, and penetrated into all sorts of places and destroyed shipping. We even shelled a railway and destroyed two troop trains. We shelled the embankment and blocked the line and then caught the trains as they came along. It was the funniest thing you can imagine to see the trains try to hide behind trees, but we caught her and smashed her all to blazes. The ammunition all blew up with a terrific explosion. The soldiers, of course, got out and took cover and fired tons of ammunition at us, but we were out of range.

Altogether we sunk one gunboat, five steamers (one of 3,000 tons), and seventeen large sailing ships, two trains, one railway embankment, and a few villagers who fired on us and got it in the neck for doing so. We also dived up to Constantinople and fired a torpedo at the wharf, at the arsenal, where there were a lot of ammunition lighters, and there was a most terrific explosion, which shook the boat although we were one and one quarter miles away. What happened I don't know, but something must have got it in the neck, judging by the bang. We had a small duel with a small gunboat one day on the surface and drove her off, although she fired 200 rounds from her two guns. After that we were left alone and everything ran like blazes when we got anywhere near. The only drawback was that we all had dysentery, and Halifax, the 2nd Officer, and a seaman got badly burned setting fire to a steamer, so Cochrane and I had to keep watch all the time, and by the time 24 days were gone we were absolutely done up. What Halifax went through with his burned feet for three weeks below, I don't know. We had no trouble diving the Sea of Marmora, but when we came down we had an awful time, as the Turks had rigged up all sorts of nets and things to catch us, and we got mixed up in them and also got fouled by mines three times. The reception we got in the harbor was great. The whole fleet and everything manned the rails and cheered us madly. Just imagine us—all dirty and unshaven, and the flag with bullet-holes all over it, and conning tower all dents from bullets and rusty —steaming through the lines, and thousands of men cheering like mad. Battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, transports, and the captains leading the cheers. It was great. I have heard cheers before, but this was the real thing. Poor old Cochrane's eyes were full of tears as he saluted to cries of "Are we downhearted?" and "Well done, E-7." At present I am resting on land and basking in the light of popular favor. It is very nice to be a hero among one's own cloth, you know, because they really mean it, and they really understand.

Yours, etc.,

We all know persons who will dislike this letter, who will detest its offhandedness and its high spirits, who will condemn the writer for being boyish and callous, who will be revolted by his failure to come anywhere near imagining the waste and the agony he deals out so lightly, as if they were all in the day's game.

And we all know that courage may burn with just as clear a flame in men whose wills are divided when war breaks out, and who cannot make their wills whole again until they have convinced themselves, by reflection and searchings of heart, that their cause is just, that its triumph is necessary to civilization, that their duty to fight is as sacred as it is painful. In the service of ideal ends men may do sternly and sadly things which they abhor and which stagger their imaginations, and may bring to the doing of these things as high a courage, and a will as unbreakable, as this young English lieutenant's, though he does these same things with unimaginative joy.

This is true enough, I suppose, but other truths exist and have their place in the world—as, for example, that this letter-writer's love of war gives him certain advantages. His lightheartedness is as unimaginative as you please, but how free it leaves his mind! His mind needs no such prop as the conviction that he is fighting for reduction of armaments, for the sacredness of treaties, for the rights of small nations, for Belgian neutrality, against militarism. When he blows up those ammunition lighters lying at the Constantinople wharf, he doesn't have to wonder what the Russians are doing, at their end of the Bosphorus, for the cause of democracy.

Some soldiers fight better if their hearts are filled with hatred. This young English lieutenant is not of these. He likes war so well that he needs neither good-looking pretexts for beginning nor hatred to go on with. He does not have to think evil of his enemies. The enemy is a name given to the game he is hunting, and he goes after Turks and Austrians and Germans with the same impartial zest. Believing almost nothing about them he has a good chance of believing little that isn't so.

Yes, it is true that "the tale of our doings is the sort of thing one reads of in the old days." Why shouldn't it be? The doer of these deeds and the writer of this letter is the kind of young Englishman who sailed under Drake four hundred years ago through the Straits of Magellan and round the world. If you go further back, rather more than twenty-five hundred years, you will find the same breed among those "young light-hearted masters of the waves," the seventh century Greeks, who risked their lives from island to island of the unknown Aegean.

Little has changed since that time except mechanism. This young Englishman can kill or be killed at longer range. He can meet death in new forms, but he meets it in the old spirit. Everywhere the sea is the sea, and he is content to follow the sea's way until death ties his quick sailor's hands. If there must be war, this is the kind of man fitted to make it without violence to his own nature. This is the happiest warrior.

P. L.

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Give Me the Sun

The Man of Promise, by Willard Huntington Wright. New York: John Lane Co. $1.35.

IN defining "what is noble" Nietzsche spoke of a good and healthy aristocracy as the significance and highest justification of society. "Society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence: like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are called *Sipo Matador,*—which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness."

This sun-seeking plant is the theme of Mr. Willard Huntington Wright. Its ascent is for him also the justification of society. But in this particular instance society does not justify itself. Mr. Wright discloses a calamity. His oak is a more than usually stubborn specimen. It does not support the plant that is using it to climb to the sun. The plant, on the contrary, is strangled. "But, to speak the truth, is not man a most miserable creature the while?"

That society can fail to live up to a man of genius is for some people a grotesque conception. For them the established order, aristocratic or democratic, is the heavenly order. The rebellious angel is the fallen angel. They would see any genius as Lucifer pitted against unalterable law. With due contempt for such persons, the fact remains that it is a difficult task to depict a man of genius, or "a man of promise," failed by society. It requires that the man of genius should be made sufficiently real. Besides the true Lucifer there are in the world many semi-Lucifers and pseudo-Lucifers. If such gentlemen were themselves allowed to judge, they have a perfect case against society. Any opposition to them is a sign of the deepest conventionality. They are victims of a conspiracy against the superman. But one does not have to be prejudiced in favor of society to decline to upbraid it for not supporting egoistic parasites. There is a difference between *Sipo Matador* and the clinging vine.

In taking up the case of genius against society, and especially against woman as the conservator of society, Mr. Wright has attempted nothing new. Schopenhauer, Strindberg, Weininger, Nietzsche, have said something on this score. But a novelist does not need to coin new ideas. It is enough if he give any ideas a human habitat. This Mr. Wright has earnestly attempted, an American writer as his hero. It is because of his inexpertness and his limitations, rather than because of his ideas, that he has failed.

In a grave and rather stilted prose Mr. Wright narrates the struggles of one Stanford West to live up to his genius. His first enemies are his academic father and his pious mother. His next enemy is the incognizant girl to whom he becomes engaged. Cambridge University proves no better for him than the small town where he grew up in the Susquehanna valley. Not only is he hampered by the intellectual cowardice of the undergraduates and the faculty. He is seduced by a predatory female named Irene. In "The Truth About Woman" there is quoted a passage from Dr. L. O. Howard describing the behavior of a female spider. A little male of the same species falls in with this lady and has a dreadful time. First she bites off his left front tarsus and consumes his tibia and femur. Next she gnaws out his left eye. She goes on to eat up his right front leg and then devours his head and gnaws into his thorax. All this time the male is seeking to embrace her. Having finished her meal on his thorax, the lady spider succumbs to his advances. "She remained quiet for four hours, and the remnant of the male gave occasional signs of life." This, approximately, is Stanford West's experience with Irene. First he parts with his money. Next he gives up his recitations. Then he discards his great classic drama and his *fiancée*. Finally he abandons his whole college career. It is his first great experience of the conflict between genius and the Irenes. In his anger with her, he beats her. This merely increases her devotion. He takes a last stand, however, against her exactions. She marries another man in desperation and thus saves him from the whole fate of the spider.

If woman interfered with Stanford West in Harvard, she proved no better in New York. Though his father and mother and *fiancée* quailed before the sunburst of his first unconventional drama, they extracted him tenderly from the wreckage caused by Irene, and he went to New York to make a career as dramatic critic. There, however, another woman lay in wait for him. She was an actress. She allowed him to use his influence as a critic. Not content with this, she made herself his mistress. She distressed him by her slovenliness and incensed him by her bad cooking. And then, to complete her disregard for his convenience and his genius, she became pregnant. She put him to the immense trouble of procuring an abortion. This broke him down, and if his *fiancée* had not consoled him by hastening to marry him the case against her sex would be overwhelming.

This simple girl who marries Stanford is named Alice, after her counterpart, Alice Benbolt. Luckily, she has a little money. With this for backing, she and Stanford go off to London, where his greatness is at last to be consummated away from noxious democracy and compromise. But Alice exacts worldly conformity from him. He achieves conventional greatness as a novelist in a few years, ashes in his mouth. It is not till he meets Evelyn Naesmith that he realizes he is being stifled. "It's weakness, and not conviction that binds you to mediocrity. . . . Tell me; if you changed your course, would these others that you speak of suffer more than you are suffering? And is not the present loss to the world greater than it would be if you stood forth, defiant and brutal, and gave birth to the best in you?" Stanford combats this idea. Then the frustration of his greater capacities becomes unbearably clear. He leaves Alice and the baby and with Evelyn hies to Paris and the sun.

Like other women, however, Evelyn presses her claims. He enjoyed her. "She dispelled his loneliness during his hours of rest, and, even when he was busily engaged, the consciousness of her presence afforded him a certain contentment and comfort. He found in her the necessary relief from labor. She constituted a desirable orderliness in his routine. She relieved his mind of innumerable minor annoyances which, had he been alone, would have fallen on his shoulders. She compensated him for the absence of his wife and, in a measure, furnished him with a justification for having deserted his legal obligations. His nature was such that he required a sexual and social complement; and no other woman had ever gratified his material and chemical needs with such intelligent understanding. Throughout the whole of his maturity he had demanded the presence of a woman in the house, in order that the many functionings of his masculinity might be expressed." But Evelyn is disgustingly jealous. She artfully estranges him from the best friend of his genius. He breaks with her

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after three years. "He arrived at the conclusion that it had been his idealistic regard for women which had always held him a slave. . . . The women who had hindered him had merely been repressive obstacles which, had he possessed the power, he might have conquered. His appetites, his emotions, his sentiments, perhaps even the biologic imperative of his nature—these had constituted the factors of his weakness. But he was done with women now. Henceforth he would avoid them as the unconscious enemies of all that was noblest in him. . . . Women were merely a recreation, a plaything to be taken up when the mood dictated, and put aside with the same impersonal abandonment that one would put aside a toy. His own rôle was that of the fighter; and just as the warrior must go into battle alone, so must he conquer, single-handed, the years ahead."

But his mother, his wife and his daughter remained to be disentangled. In the end, to the death of his genius, they subject him to their mere human claims.

There is a kind of genius whose relations with women are substantially those narrated by Mr. Wright. A certain feebleness and instability is characteristic of them and they live in sexual turmoil all their lives. But to make a novel of their interesting pathology requires two things; detached understanding of their singularity and a sense of their genius strong enough to give them high value in the reader's mind. Neither of these things does Mr. Wright accomplish. He does not know how to bioscope his material, in the first place. Just as the Duchess fails to communicate aristocratic personality, though violently asserting it, so Mr. Wright fails to communicate genius. This is largely a matter of technique. But worse than his failure in technique is his failure in penetration. The data of a pathology he takes to be the data of sex psychology. Quite right in respecting genius, he tries to generalize as to its obstacles with a special susceptibility in mind. The result is not reasonable. One may be sorry for the seasick without bemoaning that we cannot drain away the sea.

F. H.

Agrarian Democracy

The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, by Charles A. Beard. New York: The Macmillan Co. $2.50 net.

THE economic interpretation of history has been reviled more often than it has been understood. Traced to the influence of Karl Marx, it has shared the discredit into which the rigid Marxian doctrine has for the most part fallen. Yet, as a fact, Marx is in nowise the originator of the theory distinguished by his name. So long ago as the seventeenth century, James Harrington had urged that property takes political power as its handmaid; and if we scorn the emphatic reiteration of Marx, let it be noted that so keen an observer as Lord Acton placed the discovery among the most striking of modern times. When, indeed, the theory is closely scanned, one is struck rather by its obviousness than by its perversity. The place of desire in the formation of opinion is now among the accepted truisms of psychology. Men's wishes are, after all, their reflection, for the most part, of what they deem their self-interest. So that it is no large assumption to suggest that an examination of the interests of men will provide an important clue to their beliefs.

Professor Beard has used the economic interpretation of history with very striking effect in this important work. American history has—thanks to the constructive inspiration of Professor Turner—passed beyond that theological stage when its incidents are related as the triumphs of a beneficent deity. Nor do we any longer paint them as an instance of the inexplicable genius for self-government miraculously vouchsafed to the Anglo-Saxon race. It has been seen that the essential need is the piecemeal, often tedious, reconstruction of economic and social environment, the attempt, as Maitland put it, to think the common thought of our ancestors about common things. And when we set out to study in this light the history of the American Constitution, we see that while the Fathers were doubtless inspired by certain vague hopes of political freedom, it was yet for other purposes that they mainly assembled in convention at Philadelphia. The burden of Great Britain's control had been thrown off; but grave problems, fiscal and social no less than political and administrative, still remained to be solved. Is it conceivable—so Professor Beard has asked in an earlier book—that their answer to these problems should not have been framed in the light of their experience? The movement for confederation had been the work, for the most part, of capitalist interests. The convention itself was sanctioned by no popular vote; nor did the proletariat find representation therein. The very men who drafted the Constitution were themselves the most certain to benefit from its enactment. They were holders of property and they took especial care for its effective protection. It was to be no mere subject of the whim of popular majorities; and accordingly it was enshrined with peculiar affection in those *arcana imperii* where no man's feet may tread. "The Constitution,"

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Professor Beard has written, "was the work of a consolidated group whose interests knew no state boundaries and were truly national in their scope." Let it be added that the character of those interests left its emphatic mark upon the document of which they were the authors. The assertion does no more than suggest that they were human.

The Constitution made, it must not be thought that their task was accomplished. That agrarian party which was so bitterly opposed to the "monarchist" and commercial tendencies for which Hamilton stood chief sponsor, did not quietly lay down its arms on the morrow of defeat. If this has been for the most part customary doctrine, it is doctrine of which Professor Beard makes effective disposal. The agrarians fought relentlessly right through the administrations of Washington and Adams; and the triumph of Jefferson in 1800 was but the crown of a long and arduous struggle. For the mere drafting of the Constitution was not the half of the battle; even more important was to secure its effective operation. There were measures about the public debt, the tariff, taxation, the banking system, relations with Great Britain, each of them admitting of the most diverse interpretation. The Republicans could not afford their opponents the full front of their victory in the Convention. The Federalists represented a compact system of interests with no thought of agrarian needs. They were concerned to make secure the industrial oligarchy; and what minute concessions the Republicans obtained were won only by unrelenting vigilance. The divisions, therefore, of the Federal Convention persisted into the early administrations. Hamilton outlined a policy which struck a serious blow at the agricultural party. Is it not then of the highest significance that not a single member of the first Congress who had in 1787 opposed the Constitution supported the Hamiltonian measures? Is it not further of importance that, Jefferson apart—and at the outset of his ministerial career the latter most carefully disclaimed partisan affiliations—every noteworthy member of the first administration should have been a zealous Federalist? The cause is obvious enough. It was not known that the machine would work. As late as 1792 Washington was full of fears, and Hamilton himself could then write of an opposition that was "inveterate," and "sharpened by success." And it was the supreme good fortune of the Republicans that in the first stage of congressional conflict the inspirer of their fortunes should have been so able a foeman as Thomas Jefferson.

What were his affiliations with the Republican party? It is here that Professor Beard makes his most stimulating and original contribution to the period under discussion. He examines the periodical literature of the time, its pamphlets, its election programmes, the distribution of votes in the great election of 1800. He makes it abundantly clear that the Republican party had its roots deep down in the soil. It had half-heartedly accepted the Constitution. It was bitterly opposed to the measures by which it was put into operation. For Hamilton had neglected its interests. It had been to the commercial possibilities of the North that he directed his attention. The speculators came from the North and it was they whose interests he had mainly secured. It was they who, so the Republicans claimed, "had long fattened on the public treasury." The direct taxes had fallen for the most part on the farmers. It was the pursuit of agriculture that led to public virtue, yet upon this Hamilton had set the heaviest burden. Hamilton to them had been guilty of a breach of public trust when he stimulated the onset of a commercial age. So when Charles Pinckney wanted votes for Jefferson it was upon the latter's landed prosperity and Negroes that he laid the fullest emphasis. Thereby might the gentlemen of the South best understand how closely his fortune was identified with their interest. To the accusations of atheism and democracy there was the sure barrier of a common need. In the result the South stood by Jefferson with amazing unanimity. Virginia gave him all her electoral votes. The planters no less than the small farmers combined to show their bitter opposition to industrial capitalism. With them in the North voted the poor.

Of Jefferson himself Professor Beard paints no flattering portrait; yet the general truth of its outline is beyond all cavil. His democracy was the democracy of one bred among a race of farmers. For city workers he had nothing save a contemptuous mistrust. He hoped, indeed, for their disappearance, since to him the encouragement of manufacture was akin to the stimulation of public vice. The laborers of the earth were the chosen people of God, they were a breed incapable of corruption. The workshops of America must be in Europe. The loss in material gain would be compensated by an advance in spiritual wealth. These convictions were already present in the famous "Notes on Virginia." If, when he was elected, he did not hesitate to sacrifice the belief for which he stood, that was, as Hamilton duly said, because he never "allowed his dogmas to interfere with the pressing exigencies of public affairs." He was gifted with a positive genius for indirectness. It was the perception of this gift, the knowledge of his capacity for dubiousness, which had led the Federalists to secure his election rather than that of Burr. When he came into power, indeed, the fundamentally agrarian bias of his policy was revealed in the abolition of the hated excise duties and the purchase of Louisiana. Nor was his democratic temper any more practically evident than it had been in the State Convention of Virginia a quarter of a century before. The man, in fact, who looked upon the Federal Constitution as the embodiment of democratic ideals can hardly be said to have displayed a deep confidence in his fellow-men. The only distinction, indeed, between his attitude and that of Hamilton lay in the fact that while the latter distrusted all men, Jefferson excepted those who agreed with him. Where Hamilton was positive and efficient, Jefferson was negative and haphazard. If his phrases were fine, it was because he desired popular favor. If his promises were splendid, he never used his influence for their adequate fulfilment. Rather, when his triumph came, did he quietly annex the achievement of Federalist statesmanship. That was part of the bargain by which he attained supreme power.

Mr. Gladstone once maintained that the study of American history is an education in freedom, and Professor Beard's work is a negative confirmation of that striking aphorism. It is an exercise in the vigilance of prosperity, the proof of the case that is needed to prevent its undue encroachment upon the safeguards of the common weal. If the picture he paints loses something of the stiff solemnity of what Stubbs called the "court-dress" view of history, the revelation is in the result only the more vital and the more intimate. His book is a solid testimony to that unselfish devotion to truth which marks the school of historical thought of which Professor Beard is now among the most distinguished members. His patience, his accuracy and his energetic enthusiasm it would now be superfluous to praise. The vigor of his thought no less than the clarifying originality of his conclusions combine to place him in the front rank of American historians.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

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